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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This report describes the results of an effort to identify key analytic issues associated with 
modeling a transition to hydrogen as a fuel for light duty vehicles, and using insights 
gained from this effort to suggest ways to improve ongoing modeling efforts.  The study 
reported on here examined multiple hydrogen scenarios reported in the literature, 
identified modeling issues associated with those scenario analyses, and examined three 
DOE-sponsored hydrogen transition models in the context of those modeling issues. 
 
The three hydrogen transition models are HyTrans (contractor: Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory), MARKAL/DOE* (Brookhaven National Laboratory), and NEMS-H2 
(OnLocation, Inc).  The goals of these models are (1) to help DOE improve its R&D 
effort by identifying key technology and other roadblocks to a transition and testing its 
technical program goals to determine whether they are likely to lead to the market 
success of hydrogen technologies, (2) to evaluate alternative policies to promote a 
transition, and (3) to estimate the costs and benefits of alternative pathways to hydrogen 
development. 
 
The reviewed hydrogen scenario analyses offer a number of insights that could prove 
useful to modelers and policy analysts seeking to understand a hydrogen transition.  Key 
examples are: 
• A transition to hydrogen will look different across and even within regions, 
because of varying feedstock availability and costs, large differences in traffic 
densities, and other factors, and may require different strategies to promote the 
transition. 
• At the beginning of a transition, neither the fuel cell vehicles nor the hydrogen 
fuels are likely to be cost-competitive with conventional gasoline or diesel 
vehicles, also, potential purchasers of hydrogen vehicles and developers of 
infrastructure must deal with the risk that the transition will be delayed, reducing 
the value of their investments.   
• A hydrogen transportation system’s ability to use renewable electricity (with 
hydrogen produced by electrolysis) has been promoted as a means to greatly 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions from transportation.  However, using such 
electricity to back out fossil electricity (or to power electric vehicles) will be far 
more effective at reducing such emissions.  For the foreseeable future (until there 
is excess availability of renewable electricity) generating hydrogen might not be 
considered an optimum use of renewable electricity. 
• Hydrogen vehicles will be competing with a moving target – conventionally-
fueled vehicles will improve also, especially given the stimulus of competing with 
hydrogen vehicles; and hydrogen’s effect in reducing gasoline demand could 
cause gasoline prices to drop, making ICE-powered vehicles more competitive.   
 
 
                                                 
* MARKAL is a widely used model.  For example, the Environmental Protection Agency runs a separate 
version, as do a number of international groups. 
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On the other hand, the literature reviewed in this effort offers only modest guidance to the 
DOE and the federal government in helping to design a hydrogen R&D program and 
formulate a strategy to accelerate hydrogen use in the light-duty vehicle fuel market.  
Most of the analyses reported on in the reviewed literature basically skirt the issue of the 
transition and look at the “end state’ where hydrogen has become a primary vehicle fuel.  
Further, most of the analyses simply postulate a degree of hydrogen penetration rather 
than attempting to derive the level of penetration based on an evaluation of the factors 
that might drive hydrogen into the LDV fuels market.  In some cases, stock models are 
used to develop estimated levels of hydrogen penetration, but these depend on 
assumptions about sales of new hydrogen vehicles.  Finally, most of the analyses do not 
describe any attempt to conduct a “reality check” on the scenarios, e.g. to test whether the 
assumed rates of development would strain industry resources or whether key investment 
“actors” are likely to be able to satisfy standard investment goals.*   Thus, these analyses 
offer little insight about what conditions and/or policies would actually lead to their 
postulated levels of hydrogen penetration.  Note that the literature review “closed” in 
August, 2005, and substantial new literature on hydrogen transitions has become 
available since then, but is not reported on here. 
 
This report develops a list of characteristics for an “ideal” hydrogen transition model 
(section 5), and examines the characteristics of NEMS-H2, HyTrans, and 
MARKAL/DOE in the context of that list (section 6).  However, it would be unwise for 
us to judge one model as “better” or “worse” than the others for most characteristics 
because there are important tradeoffs to be made in selecting each aspect of model 
design.  This is especially the case because many aspects of the behavior of potential 
investors in a hydrogen transition (including vehicle purchasers) and the characteristics of 
a future hydrogen economy are poorly understood, so that investments in model 
complexity and disaggregation risk outrunning the state of knowledge.  Hopefully, 
however, this examination of hydrogen scenarios and modeling issues will offer some 
useful insights for both the transition modelers and for DOE analysts hoping to better 
understand whether and how to create a successful transition to hydrogen in the transport 
sector. 
 
A crucial issue facing those trying to model a hydrogen transition is the difficulty of 
credibly modeling the behavior of the key actors who will drive a transition to hydrogen 
– consumers who may purchase hydrogen vehicles; vehicle manufacturers; fuel suppliers; 
and fuel distributors (and the investors needed to bankroll the latter three actors).  
Modeling consumer behavior is a difficult enterprise in the best of circumstances, but 
modeling potential buyers of hydrogen vehicles is further complicated by large 
uncertainties in how such vehicles will behave and how much they will cost, as well as 
by consumers’ lack of experience with a hydrogen refueling system.  Modeling the 
vehicle and fuels industry is complicated by the large uncertainties in future market 
conditions these industries will face and in the costs and performance of vehicle and fuel 
production technologies.  In particular, the fact that industry faces a “chicken or egg” 
problem – without developed markets, investors in vehicle manufacturing, hydrogen 
                                                 
* Presumably, some of these analyses explicitly considered restraints on maximum growth rates, but 
generally these were not documented in the literature reviewed here. 
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production, and fuel distribution all have to rely on each other to follow through on their 
investments in order to have any chance at success—greatly complicates modeling 
industry behavior.  Modelers also have to make difficult decisions about the level of 
aggregation they will use to describe the various actors and the behavioral rules they will 
apply to them. 
 
Although there are large differences in the three models examined in this report, all three 
have chosen to model consumers and investors as if they had a clear view of future fuel 
prices and other conditions – either “perfect foresight” where they “see” the scenario of 
the future that has been input to the model, or “myopia,” which assumes that the future 
will look like the present (or that current trends will continue).  In this approach, in any 
particular model run, uncertainty in future conditions may be partially accounted for by 
increasing the financial hurdle rates that investors will apply to potential investments in 
vehicle manufacturing plants and other infrastructure, but is otherwise not taken into 
accounted.  On the other hand, multiple runs of the models, with varying future 
conditions, may be able to give insight about the effect on industry behavior of 
uncertainty in future market conditions and technology costs and performance.  However, 
to our knowledge the modelers have not yet defined a method to translate the results of 
multiple runs into an account of likely behavior under uncertainty. 
 
Another important modeling issue is choosing the level of detail applied to the potential 
“actors” in a transition, as well as to the overall environment they face.  For example, the 
MARKAL/DOE model treats the energy sector as if it were a single actor, whereas 
HYTRANS examines actions of individual vehicle manufacturing plants – though these 
plants are basically all the same.  And NEMS divides the U.S. into census regions, 
whereas HYTRANS recognizes 3 geographic regions within the U.S. (and further 
subdivides each region into 3 levels of density of demand), and MARKAL/DOE treats 
the U.S. as a single region.*  Although it is simplistic to assume that “more detail is 
better” – more detail increases model complexity and cost, and demands data and an 
understanding of the behavior of individual actors that may not be available – the level of 
disaggregation in a model will affect the types of polices that can be examined.  For 
example, highly aggregated models may not be able to model targeted incentives (e.g., 
incentives aimed only at small distributors or at low density rural areas), although these 
might be critical in developing an affordable incentive program for a hydrogen transition. 
 
 
There are a number of additional modeling and analysis issues that will require careful 
consideration in future efforts to model a hydrogen transition.  These include: 
 
1. Choosing a Reference Case.  Replacement of our massive gasoline infrastructure 
probably makes sense only in the context of a world where there is severe danger 
of energy security emergencies and/or environmental calamity.  There is a 
tendency in scenario analyses to use standard Reference Cases such as that in the 
Energy Information Administration’s Annual Energy Outlook.  However, these 
                                                 
* Both DOE and EPA are in the process of regionalizing their versions of MARKAL. 
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Reference Cases generally describe a world of relative energy and environmental 
stability, and are inappropriate for use in a hydrogen scenario analysis. 
2. Using Optimization Models.  HyTrans and MARKAL/DOE use optimization to 
develop least cost scenarios.  A key issue here is how well these scenarios are 
likely to relate to what actually will unfold in the real world, and whether the 
testing of policies under optimization routines will identify the same “best” 
policies that would be identified if one could realistically model real world 
behavior. 
3. Capturing Learning Effects.  The process of cost reduction through “learning” 
effects is complex and imperfectly understood, but it is likely that existing 
modeling efforts to track learning will miss some important nuances.  
Technological learning is not perfectly shared among industry actors, and crosses 
national boundaries because so many of the industry “actors” are multinational 
corporations likely to be developing hydrogen infrastructure in several places at 
once.  Current models tend to look only within national boundaries and only at the 
industry as a single entity.  What makes this particularly important in modeling a 
hydrogen transition is that early hydrogen vehicle and other elements of the 
infrastructure will likely be extremely expensive, and cost reductions through 
learning are absolutely crucial to successfully navigating a transition. 
 
It is true of all models that proper interpretation of their results demands a good 
understanding of the model’s structure and limitations – and this is certainly true for 
hydrogen transition models, perhaps more so than for other transport models.   Modelers 
of hydrogen transition are going to have to be careful to make it clear to model users and 
policymakers how their model’s character and assumptions affect modeling results, and 
they should be careful in describing what types of analyses the model is good for, and 
what types might be problematic.  And hopefully the modelers will play a role in 
designing (or at least reviewing) analyses using their model and in interpreting model 
results.  
 
There are strong differences among the three models examined here, and among these 
and other transition models currently under development.  It is inevitable that there will 
also be strong differences among the results obtained from these models.  Previous 
studies by the Energy Modeling Forum (at Stanford University) and others have proven 
very useful in providing comparative analyses of complex models, and duplicating such 
efforts with hydrogen transition models could prove equally useful.  
 
It is useful to point out that it is not possible at this time to identify a “best” approach to 
modeling a transition to hydrogen, even if the model users and their analytic requirements 
can be clearly defined.  Methods for analyzing long-term energy market transitions are in 
their infancy.  Also, a transition to hydrogen fuel cell vehicles will rely on novel 
technology with which consumers have no experience and whose costs and performance 
are highly uncertain.  There is limited experience in analyzing futures under this level of 
uncertainty.   
  
5 
1. INTRODUCTION 
U.S. interest in a transition from oil-based liquid fuels to hydrogen as the energy source 
for vehicles has grown markedly during the past decade because of a convergence of 
factors:  
• Growing U.S. oil imports coupled with the growing market power of OPEC 
(hydrogen could be produced largely or completely from domestic resources); 
• An emerging concern that world conventional oil production may peak during the 
first half of this century, requiring the production of massive quantities of 
replacement fuels; 
• Growing concerns about climate change (hydrogen use in vehicles produces no 
greenhouse gases, although hydrogen production would do so unless the 
feedstocks were renewable or otherwise carbon neutral). 
• Substantial technical progress in the development of PEM fuel cells and other 
technologies needed for a transition to hydrogen use in transportation. 
U.S. and worldwide research efforts in hydrogen development have grown rapidly.  In 
his 2003 State of the Union address, President Bush announced the Hydrogen Fuel 
Initiative, a $1.2 billion commitment over 5 years to accelerate hydrogen-related 
research to move hydrogen vehicles from the laboratory to the showroom. 
 
A substantial focus of the U.S. program is on how to manage a transition to hydrogen.   
As part of this effort, DOE’s Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy 
(EERE) is sponsoring the enhancement of existing models (e.g. NEMS and MARKAL) 
and the development of new models (e.g., HYTRANS) that will examine this transition 
under alternative scenarios of future economic and social conditions and assist EERE in: 
• Enhancing its R&D effort by improving DOE’s understanding of the relative 
importance of a range of technological and other roadblocks to a successful 
transition (thus improving its ability to properly allocate R&D funds); 
• Calculating the costs and benefits of alternative pathways to hydrogen 
development; and 
• Evaluating alternative policies to promote a transition.  
Box 1 briefly describes the three models. 
 
Box 1.  NEMS, MARKAL, and HyTrans 
The National Energy Modeling System, or NEMS, is a general equilibrium energy-
economic model of U.S. energy markets.  NEMS contains modules representing each of 
the fuel supply markets, conversion sectors, and end use consumption sectors of the 
energy system, plus macroeconomic and international modules; these modules 
communicate through an integrating module rather than directly with each other.  NEMS 
reaches a solution by calling each supply, conversion, and end-use demand module in 
sequence until the delivered prices of energy and the quantities demanded have 
converged, achieving an economic equilibrium of supply and demand in the consuming 
sectors.  NEMS’s time horizon is 25 years.  Depending on sector, NEMS divides the 
nation into 3 to 20 regions, with electricity production divided into 13 regions.  
 
The MARKet ALlocation  model, or MARKAL, is a dynamic linear programming model 
of the national economy that contains a database of several hundred processes covering 
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the lifecycle for energy and materials flows in the economic system.  The model 
calculates a least cost characterization of the flows and processes of the economy under 
constraints such as the maximum introduction rate of new technologies, availability of 
resources, environmental goals for energy use and emissions, and so forth, assuming 
perfect foresight where future constraints are taken into account in current investment 
decisions and all time periods are simultaneously optimized.  MARKAL is a long-term 
model with a time horizon on the order of 40-80 years. 
 
The Hydrogen Transition Model, or HyTrans, is a market equilibrium simulation model 
that solves for the decisions of hydrogen producers and retailers, vehicle manufacturers 
and consumers.  It is a dynamic, multi-period optimization model that represents the 
behavior of the various actors in the hydrogen energy system as rational economic agents.  
HYTRANS covers the period from 2005 to 2050.  The current version divides the United 
States into three geographic regions and three fuel density demand regions within each 
geographic region.  Unlike NEMS and MARKAL, HyTrans does not attempt to model 
the entire energy system, but instead links to NEMS to obtain information on the 
interaction of the hydrogen economy with the larger economy and the environment. 
 
 
A specific focus on the transition period – whose length will vary depending on how 
rapidly a hydrogen vehicle economy is adopted but might last two or three decades -- is 
necessary because this period will have characteristics that are quite different from those 
likely to be present in the longer term, when hydrogen has thoroughly penetrated the 
light-duty market.  These differences include: 
a. New vehicle, production, and distribution technologies may be 
considerably more expensive than they will be in the longer run, because 
they won’t yet have had the benefit of years of learning and mass 
production.  In addition, early vehicle models (and possibly early 
production equipment) may have unforeseen maintenance problems that 
will likely be eliminated or considerably reduced in the longer term. 
b. Technology introduced during the transition period may become 
outmoded quite rapidly, because technology change will be swift during 
this period.  This may cause problems for vehicle resale and create an 
incentive for potential purchasers of vehicles, small production facilities, 
and other technologies to delay their investment and let others take the risk 
of being early adopters. 
c. The problems associated with limited availability of refueling facilities, 
shortages of trained mechanics, and difficulties with other parts of the 
vehicle and fuel infrastructure; performance and maintenance issues of 
early vehicle technology; higher costs; and the uniqueness of the vehicles 
means that, during the initial stages of the transition, the potential 
customer base is limited to fleets and to “early adopters,” whose buying 
characteristics are likely to be quite different from the majority of the total 
population of potential purchasers. 
d. Investment risks are much higher during this period, demanding higher 
risk-related rates of return, etc.  In particular, during the transition the risk 
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of stranded investments may be quite high, because infrastructure must be 
built in advance of hydrogen demand. 
Because of these factors, substantial government involvement in promoting a transition 
appears to be essential to success, although the precise nature of such involvement 
requires extensive analysis. 
 
This paper has two purposes: 
1. To present insights about the process of evaluating a transition to hydrogen based 
on a literature review of papers and presentations describing scenarios of a future 
transition to extensive hydrogen use in the U.S. light-duty vehicle and stationary 
markets;. 
2. To apply these insights towards suggesting ways to strengthen the EERE-
sponsored models used to analyze a transition to hydrogen. 
 
It is useful to point out that it is not possible at this time to identify a “best” approach to 
modeling a transition to hydrogen, even if the model users and their analytic requirements 
can be clearly defined.  Methods for analyzing long-term energy market transitions are in 
their infancy.  Also, a transition to hydrogen fuel cell vehicles will rely on novel 
technology with which consumers have no experience and whose costs and performance 
are highly uncertain.  There is limited experience in analyzing futures under this level of 
uncertainty.   
 
2. APPROACH 
The approach of this study was as follows: 
• Literature review: The literature on future scenarios of hydrogen use was 
reviewed, along with some additional material debating the pros and cons of 
future hydrogen development.  The scenarios reviewed varied from Statewide to 
national, and a few foreign countries, of greatly varying magnitude.  The primary 
focus of the literature review was on methodology rather than results, i.e. on 
the type of analyses conducted, the variables used to describe the scenario 
outcomes, the use of reference scenarios, the documentation provided, and 
other features that can inform the process of evaluating future hydrogen 
transitions -- not on the magnitude or geography of the hydrogen transition 
described.  Unfortunately, there was a significant delay between completion 
of the literature review and the remainder of this study; as a result, literature 
published after August, 2005 is not covered in this report.  
• Identify analytic issues: A variety of analytic issues associated with evaluating a 
hydrogen transition were identified by examining and comparing the analytic 
frameworks of the reviewed literature and by identifying gaps in the scenario 
analyses.  Also, the literature discussing the pros and cons of a hydrogen 
transition yielded insights about areas of scientific controversy and calculations 
that required special attention from the modelers. 
• Formulate a “wish list” of requirements for a hydrogen transition model: Based on 
the analytic issues identified above, a list was formulated of requirements for an 
“ideal” hydrogen transition model, recognizing that the requirements might 
conflict with resource limitations as well as shortcomings in analysis 
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methodologies required to evaluate key variables.  A more practical approach for 
examining a range of policy questions might be to develop a few models designed 
for subsets of the range of questions and audiences. 
• Characterize existing EERE-sponsored hydrogen models and contrast to the “wish 
list”: Using the characteristics identified in the wish list as a guide, a 
questionnaire was designed and distributed to the modelers responsible for the 
EERE models asking them to characterize their own models for contrast and 
comparison. 
• Identify opportunities for future model development: Such identification should 
flow from contrasting the model characteristics to the “wish list,” taking into 
account the specific purposes of the models.  
 
3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
All in all, 47 separate items were reviewed for the literature review.*  Appendix A lists 
the papers and presentations reviewed, and Appendix B presents each of the individual 
reviews.  In a number of cases, slide presentations describing scenario analyses were 
reviewed but more detailed documentation was not obtained.  Similarly, several of the 
papers are brief and may not represent the most extensive documentation available, 
although such documentation could not be located.  Given the limitations of the scenario 
documentation obtained, it is possible that some of the scenarios were constructed with 
more analytic foundation than was apparent from their descriptions and described in this 
paper.   
 
The literature review was completed in April, 2005, and a considerable period of time 
passed before this report could be completed.  During this period, a substantial volume of 
new literature describing hydrogen scenario analyses has been published, but 
unfortunately this recent literature is not reflected in this discussion.  
 
Table 1 presents the review format used for the majority of the reviews completed for this 
effort. 
 
Table 1.  Hydrogen Scenarios Literature Review   
 
1. Full citation, including web site if applicable   
2. Scenario description, if applicable 
a. Description of “vision,” if applicable:  
b. Dates and interval: 
c. Extent of focus on transition; possibly break out 2010-2030? 
d. Key variables projected, e.g. petroleum consumption, carbon 
equivalent, FCV penetration, hydrogen price  
e. Methodology: “eyeballing,” stock model, historic analogy, etc.     
3. Does analysis/modeling include consideration of hydrogen’s competitors, e.g. 
biomass to liquids?  
a. Scope: LDVs only, total transport, other sectors included  
b. Geographic scope: regional, national, international  
                                                 
* As noted, the review “closed” in April, 2005, and more recent literature is not covered. 
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c. Hydrogen production: feedstocks (biomass, wind electricity, etc), 
technologies  
d. Unique characteristics of the scenario development, e.g. risk 
analysis/scenario probability  
4. Identification of key scenario drivers: technology advances; government 
policy measures (subsidy/incentives; CAFE regulation; government fleets; 
demo projects; broken out by H2 specific and general); changes in consumer 
attitudes; high fuel prices 
5. Identification of key roadblocks  
6. Interesting results/conclusions  
7. Comments on overall credibility (judgment by reviewer)  
 
Although the focus of the literature reviews was on methodology and insights that would 
be useful for evaluating transition modeling, the results presented by the scenario reports 
are of interest. 
 
 
Many of the conclusions and results reported in the literature reviewed are “self-evident” 
and could have been anticipated from a general understanding of hydrogen 
characteristics, production and distribution methods, and vehicle technologies.  These 
results can be summarized as follows: 
• Hydrogen in transportation still has several technological roadblocks that will 
have to be overcome before it will be viable, and there are no guarantees that 
these roadblocks will be overcome. 
• At the beginning of the transition, neither the fuel cell vehicles nor the hydrogen 
fuels are likely to be cost-competitive with conventional gasoline or diesel 
vehicles, also, potential purchasers of hydrogen vehicles must deal with the risk 
that the transition will stall and their investments will become useless.  This 
problem demands a strong government role in the transition. 
• The transition to hydrogen will be a period of rapid technological change and 
economic changes from the rapid growth of hydrogen production and distribution 
infrastructure.  These changes may cause a portion of the new physical assets (for 
example, small-scale hydrogen production equipment) to become obsolete quite 
rapidly. 
• Hydrogen vehicles will be competing with a moving target – conventionally-
fueled vehicles will improve also, especially given the stimulus of competing with 
hydrogen vehicles; and hydrogen’s effect in reducing gasoline demand could 
cause gasoline prices to drop.  Also, other vehicle types, e.g. hybrids, will 
improve as well. 
• Reducing vehicle loads (by reducing vehicle weight, improving tires and 
aerodynamics, and making accessories more efficient) will allow easier hydrogen 
storage and cheaper fuel cell drivetrains, by improving efficiency and reducing 
drivetrain power requirements. 
• Because H2 production feedstock prices and other key factors will vary 
substantially from region to region (and even within regions), the transition may 
look different across these areas and may require different strategies. 
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Aside from these “self-evident” results, the scenario reports examine a wide range of 
issues, yield numerous insights, and present some interesting disagreements about key 
issues. 
 
Some of the results and conclusions are quite important and probably not “self-evident,” 
that is, they appear to be valuable additions to the state-of-knowledge (or at least the 
state-of-knowledge among those who are not experts in this area).  We would include 
among this class the following conclusions: 
• A hydrogen economy is almost certainly going to be a high energy economy, 
because hydrogen production and distribution are energy intensive. 
• Although the investments needed for a transition to hydrogen may seem daunting, 
they are not necessarily massively higher than those investments needed to 
maintain the current petroleum-based system. 
• Substantial penetration of hydrogen into the vehicle market may cause dramatic 
shifts in the petroleum refining market, with drops in gasoline prices and the 
likelihood of shifts in refinery technology and operations. 
• Although a hydrogen transportation system’s ability to use renewable electricity 
has been promoted as a means to greatly reduce greenhouse gas emissions from 
transportation, using such electricity to back out fossil electricity (or to power 
electric vehicles) will be far more effective at reducing such emissions.  For the 
foreseeable future (until there is excess availability of renewable electricity) 
generating hydrogen might be considered a poor use of renewable electricity. 
• Also, although electrolysis has been promoted as an effective way to produce 
hydrogen, making use of off-peak (thus cheap) electricity, the costs are likely to 
be high.  Restricting hydrogen production to off-peak hours causes the “per 
kilogram of hydrogen” capital cost to be very high; and the more effective use of 
capital, producing hydrogen around the clock, will likely be accompanied by high 
average electricity costs. 
 
There are some areas where there are sharp disagreements among studies, particularly in 
the area of the preferred speed and character of a transition to hydrogen and the “best” 
hydrogen production alternatives.  For example, there is sharp disagreement about 
whether the transition should be fast or slow – obviously a crucial issue.  This 
disagreement may revolve around the tradeoff between the advantages of quickly 
constructing a very broad infrastructure, to allow hydrogen vehicles to go anywhere (thus 
maximizing their market attractiveness), and the potential for a rapid deployment to 
create large numbers of vehicles and refueling facilities that might appear outmoded as 
technology moves on.  Other factors in this disagreement might be the effect of 
deployment speed on construction costs (for example, the potential to outrun the supply 
of skilled labor) and personnel training capability and effects on the level and extent of 
government subsidies required.  It is not clear, however, whether factors such as labor 
availability were accounted for in the studies. 
 
As discussed earlier, the primary purpose of the literature review was to surface analytic 
issues that would, in turn, yield insights about how models could best evaluate a 
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hydrogen transition.  The next section discusses the analytic insights gained from the 
review. 
 
4. INSIGHTS GAINED FROM THE LITERATURE REVIEW 
4.1 Overview 
If the literature reviewed is a good representation of the total literature on hydrogen 
futures, an important conclusion of the review is that the analysis of hydrogen futures is 
at an early stage, and that considerable additional work will be needed to provide 
appropriate guidance to DOE, and the federal government in general, in fine-tuning the 
hydrogen R&D program and formulating a strategy to accelerate hydrogen into the light-
duty vehicle fuel market.  Although the transition to hydrogen is the development phase 
that likely will require the most help from government, most of the scenarios reviewed 
do not explicitly examine this phase but instead focus their attention on the long-
term hydrogen economy.   
 
In addition, none of the scenarios examined “surprises,” that is, oil disruptions, 
global climate change discontinuities, or other events that might significantly and 
rapidly alter society’s and individuals’ calculus of a hydrogen economy’s costs and 
benefits.   
 
Also, in most of the scenarios, the crucial variables that specify the degree of 
hydrogen penetration were exogeneously specified; they were not derived from an 
analytic computation of factors that might affect the market entry of hydrogen fuel and 
vehicles, such as fuel prices, vehicle costs, etc.  In other words, the key scenario results – 
such as the number of gasoline vehicles replaced by hydrogen vehicles, the reduction in 
gasoline and diesel use, and changes in GHG emissions. – arise because the scenario 
developers have specified either the hydrogen vehicle penetration into the new fleet or, in 
the extreme, the total penetration of hydrogen vehicles into the complete onroad fleet.  In 
the former case, the analysts use a vehicle stock model to track the roll-in of the hydrogen 
vehicles into the total onroad fleet.  In both cases, the results are most useful in answering 
the question, “How would a successful transition to hydrogen affect oil use, emissions of 
greenhouse gases, investment expenses, and other important variables?”  In either case, 
however, there is no analysis that shows why hydrogen-fueled vehicles are purchased 
(and why the necessary refueling infrastructure and hydrogen production 
investments are made), and thus there is little to be learned about what conditions 
and/or policies would actually lead to this result. 
 
Further, most of the scenario analyses did not test their results for realism.  Such tests 
might involve comparing the implied construction rates for infrastructure investment to 
historical rates during times when conditions demanded rapid new investment; computing 
how long it would take for cash flow to become positive for key investors; or even just 
explicitly cataloging what the drivers of the scenario would have to be to achieve the 
postulated levels of hydrogen production and consumption.  In much of the reviewed 
analyses, levels of hydrogen production and sales of fuel cell vehicles are presented 
without an explicit discussion of the methodology used to derive these levels; although it 
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is recognized that careful analysis may have been undertaken to develop the scenarios, in 
most cases this analysis is not described or even mentioned. 
 
Despite the early stage of current scenario development literature, the literature review 
illuminated a number of issues about a transition to hydrogen and about how this 
transition might be explored that are worth sharing. 
 
4.2 Choosing a Reference Case 
Virtually all of the scenario analyses directly compare a scenario with extensive 
penetration of hydrogen into the light-duty fleet with another scenario in which hydrogen 
does not penetrate.  This Reference Case is used to compute reductions in greenhouse 
gas emissions and oil consumption, capital expenditures, and a host of other comparative 
values stemming from the hydrogen penetration.  Selection of an appropriate 
Reference Case is thus crucial to the validity of the study results, because so many 
of the results are “differences” between the two cases rather than absolute values. 
 
Reference Cases may have several uses, but the most common use in the reviewed 
papers is to address the following question: What difference will introduction and 
penetration of hydrogen vehicles into the LDV fleet make to greenhouse gas emissions, 
oil use, and other important variables?  For this question to be appropriately addressed, 
the hydrogen scenario should differ from the Reference Case only in policies designed to 
promote hydrogen use; otherwise, the hydrogen penetration should occur in the same 
“world” as the Reference Case.  In other words, variables such as oil prices, consumer 
values, interest rates, and so forth should be the same except to the extent that the 
hydrogen policies and their results may change them. 
 
Many of the scenario analyses chose reference cases from existing projections, e.g. the 
Energy Information Administration’s Annual Energy Outlook (AEO) Reference Case, 
based on the National Energy Modeling System (NEMS).  This type of reference case is 
appropriate, however, only if the hydrogen scenario(s) adopt the same input assumptions 
as the AEO, e.g. oil prices, economic growth rates, etc. and the basic policy prescription 
of the AEO, which is that no changes in energy policy are considered except those 
policies that drive the penetration of hydrogen.  However, it must be recognized that the 
“world” described by such a hydrogen scenario would be a highly unusual one, where a 
series of heroic measures are taken to stimulate hydrogen’s massive penetration into the 
light-duty vehicle fleet but where no other measures are taken to stimulate other 
technologies and behavioral changes that could help to accomplish the same ends sought 
with the hydrogen penetration.  Also, the worlds described by the AEO Reference Cases 
used by the scenario analyses examined in the literature review (AEO2004 and earlier) 
are ones in which there are few reasons, aside from climate change, to seek a radical 
change in vehicle fuels, because the AEO worlds have plentiful supplies of liquid fuel 
obtainable at moderate prices.  (However, more recent analyses using the latest version of 
AEO (2006) now have a High Oil Price Case that postulates a year 2030 oil price of 
approximately $90/barrel in 2004$.  This scenario does represent a world where scarce 
and expensive oil supplies provide a strong incentive for a hydrogen transition.  On the 
other hand, the AEO2006  Reference postulates a year 2030 oil price of about $50/barrel 
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– higher than in previous years but probably still representing a world with adequate 
supplies of oil.) 
 
In reality, many consider that the Hydrogen Fuel Initiative is being undertaken to guard 
against a very different world from the one described in the AEO Reference Case – one 
in which oil has become scarce and expensive, and the potential for oil disruption is high 
enough to demand heroic measures to guard against U.S. overdependence on imports 
from unreliable sources.  In other words, the Initiative is an insurance policy against the 
risk that the future will be considerably more perilous than foreseen by the AEO 
Reference Case.  However, if this is the case, then a more appropriate Reference Case 
for analysis of hydrogen scenarios is one in which the condition of the world justifies 
taking heroic measures to reduce oil use (and possibly GHG emissions), although quite 
possibly without foresight.  Although one possible Reference Case within this 
framework is the “No Policy Change” case, it should be recognized that the market 
would almost certainly react to this case by increasing LDV fuel economy to levels 
substantially higher than the AEO Reference Case values.  The baseline vehicle for such 
a case might more appropriately be lighter and more streamlined than the AEO 
Reference vehicle, perhaps with a hybrid or diesel drivetrain and some penetration of 
alternative fuels.  The net result of choosing such a baseline is that the net effects of the 
hydrogen economy will be less – perhaps considerably less -- than would be measured 
against a “business as usual” (BAU) scenario. 
 
An added comment about the baseline drivetrain and fuel is that some of the policies 
used to drive the hydrogen economy may be general enough to affect a range of 
drivetrains and fuels.  Policies might include taxes on gasoline; renewable fuels 
standards; fuel economy standards; and so forth.  An integrated model will automatically 
capture the effects of these policies on competing fuels and drivetrains, but many of the 
scenarios are based on stock models or other simple models that require exogeneous 
assumptions about the competing fuels and drivetrains.  It is the responsibility of the 
analyst to ensure that the effects of the policies on all alternatives are captured and used 
in scenario comparisons.  
 
 
4.3 Scenario Development Methods  
There are several methods of developing scenarios of hydrogen penetration into the LDV 
fleet, some involving formal models of varying complexity.  Although the value of these 
methods to their potential users depends in large part on the basic quality of the analytic 
process and the data used, their value also depends critically on what questions the users 
want answered.   
 
The scenario development options are: 
1. Projection Model.  Use of a projection model such as NEMS requires 
specification of initial conditions and formulation of a “state-of-the-world” 
scenario that defines a time series of variables such as future oil prices (which 
may be allowed to change depending on how the projection unfolds), economic 
growth rates, policies, and so forth.  In this method, the rate of hydrogen 
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development would follow from vehicle choice models (and possibly investment 
models), which depend in turn on variables such as the prices of competing fuels, 
vehicle prices, etc.  The initial costs of hydrogen vehicles might be defined in the 
initial scenario input to the model, with the model then projecting future cost 
reductions with learning and scale, as vehicle sales increase. 
2. Optimization Model.  This type of model might be a subset of projection models 
that assumes that market behavior will follow an optimized path, e.g. towards a 
least cost solution.  Another version of this model might start with a desired 
outcome, e.g. a hydrogen production target or a future goal for penetration of 
large numbers of fuel cell vehicles, and find an optimum path for achieving that 
outcome.  The optimum can be defined in purely economic terms, e.g. least cost, 
or can incorporate societal goals. 
3. Stock Model Approach.  This is a simple approach whereby the outlines of a 
hydrogen scenario, for example sales of FCVs over time,  are specified and a 
stock model is used to translate sales into a time series of actual numbers of 
FCVs in operation.  Generally, the initial hydrogen scenario represents either a 
project goal or an option developed by expert judgment.  An alternative is to 
specify a target hydrogen penetration (total vehicle stock or hydrogen use) and 
use a stock model and trial-and-error to find a vehicle sales pathway that will 
reach that penetration.  In this case, however, it must be recognized that there are 
multiple pathways that will reach the same penetration. 
4. Pure Judgmental Approach.  This is similar to the Stock Model Approach 
except that judgment is used to arrive at the “final product,” the actual hydrogen 
scenario with on-road numbers of FCVs specified or the total hydrogen use in the 
LDV fleet for a future year.  Approaches 3 and 4 are essentially equivalent since 
they both rely on expert judgment to project the outlines of a hydrogen 
development scenario; the 3rd approach asks for judgment about sales and the 4th 
asks for judgment about stock.  Sometimes the judgmental scenario development 
is accomplished by a formal quantitative procedure.  For example, with Battelle’s 
Interactive Future Simulations method, expert judgment is used to identify a set 
of descriptors that are most important to the topic in question; alternative 
outcomes are defined for each descriptor; expert judgment is used to identify the 
probability of occurrence of the outcomes for each descriptor; expert judgment is 
again used to set up a cross-impact matrix whose components define how the 
occurrence of one descriptor affects the others; and a computer program is used 
to calculate the probabilities of occurrence of different sets of outcomes 
(scenarios). (Millett and Mahadevan, undated). 
 
In general, this brief list of scenario analysis approaches moves from the most complex to 
the least (although it is quite possible that an expert-judgment-based approach using a 
cross-impact matrix may be more complex that use of a stock model coupled with a goal-
defined level of hydrogen development).  The potential benefit of complexity is the 
possibility of capturing subtle or counterintuitive outcomes arising from successful 
modeling of what is in reality a very complex process; the almost-certain cost of 
complexity is increased difficulty in understanding how the model works, and difficulty 
in deciphering the extent to which model outcomes may be driven by initial assumptions 
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rather than robust analysis.  One aspect of this increased difficulty is that, if one wishes to 
explore the impact of changing those variables one is most unsure of, the more complex 
models simply have more variables to examine, thus it is less likely that such exploration 
will be undertaken.  One simple rule that flows from this tradeoff is the following: Do not 
value complexity in a model without understanding its details. 
 
Another problem with complexity is that it demands an understanding of the processes 
being modeled that may or may not exist.  For example, it would appear highly desirable 
to calculate the changing market share of hydrogen-fueled vehicles using a vehicle choice 
model dependent on various market variables (fuel prices, vehicle costs, vehicle 
performance characteristics, etc) rather than specifying the share exogeneously; the 
model with endogeneously-derived market share can then project how changes in market 
conditions (for example, a vehicle subsidy, or R&D success in reducing vehicle costs) 
will affect vehicle market share and hydrogen demand.  On the other hand, a credible 
vehicle choice model demands a good understanding of how potential vehicle purchasers 
will actually react to a vehicle that may be quite different in many aspects from existing 
ones (thus, available revealed preference data on vehicle purchase behavior may not be 
fully helpful), in a time frame somewhat distant from today’s.  The choice, then, of 
whether or not to include a vehicle choice model is one of trading off the imperfect nature 
of the resulting model and the uncertainty it would add to the overall model results vs. the 
benefits it would provide in added model capability in evaluating alternative policies or 
the effects of different market conditions.  This type of choice will be repeated many 
times in developing comprehensive hydrogen transition models. 
 
As noted above, the variety of modeling or other approaches to scenario construction and 
analysis may be more or less suitable depending on the questions being addressed.  For 
example: 
Question 1. What are the costs and benefits of hydrogen development, including 
GHG emissions reductions, oil use reductions, investment costs, etc.?  
This question lies at the heart of government decisions about whether to 
pursue expensive R&D programs aimed at stimulating development of a 
hydrogen economy.  The answers to this question will also influence 
decisions about whether to support a variety of policies designed to promote 
hydrogen use, although they may be insufficient to select the best among 
alternative policies aimed at the same outcome.  Scenario analyses stemming 
from exogeneously specified levels of hydrogen vehicle penetration using 
expert judgment and stock models, or even expert judgment alone, may be 
satisfactory methods of addressing this question as it pertains to long-term 
costs and benefits.  However, these methods will have difficulty evaluating 
the period of the transition to hydrogen.  More sophisticated models may be 
capable of defining the timing and perhaps the character of a hydrogen 
transition more realistically than judgmental approaches.   
Question 2. Will hydrogen development occur if the world unfolds as we think it 
will (e.g., if oil prices, economic development, policies, etc. occur as we 
expect them to)?  Or, Under what circumstances will hydrogen 
development unfold?  Theoretically, a projection model would be the best 
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option (assuming it is credible), although judgmental approaches may well 
attempt to answer the question.  To find out what various combinations of 
circumstances will yield hydrogen development, it would be necessary to 
rerun the projection model many times with varying inputs to identify those 
yielding a favorable outcome.  An alternative way to address this question 
might be to use a stock model to project the results of a development 
scenario, and calculate the costs of the scenario under varying economic 
conditions to gauge the range of conditions for which it might be realistic.  
The problem here is that, given the large uncertainties in most of the key 
economic drivers and the very early stage of development of our ability to 
analyze long-term market transitions, these basic questions can at best be 
addressed – probably not “answered” -- by gaining insights from running the 
various models under a range of assumptions.  Given this, it is not clear 
whether any type of model is “best” for addressing these questions. 
Question 3. Given a desired outcome (e.g., x billion kilograms of hydrogen used 
in LDVs in the year Y, or more generally, satisfying transportation 
energy demand over a specified period at the least social cost), what is 
the most desirable path to get there?  An Optimization Model is designed 
to identify a path to a specified goal that satisfies an objective function, e.g. 
“least cost,” and thus can identify some aspects of the market path to achieve 
that goal.  The alternative to using an optimization model is to examine a 
wide range of pathways using a simpler model and compare the results 
according to the same set of criteria used in the optimization model.  
Alternatively, an optimization model can be programmed to generate a 
number of alternative pathways within some incremental cost of the least cost 
pathway.  The similarities and/or differences among these alternatives can 
provide insight regarding the flexibility available to achieve the goals cost-
effectively.  This approach can also identify alternatives that may be superior 
to the least-cost “optimum” with respect to characteristics not counted in the 
optimization analysis.  
Question 4. What is an appropriate allocation of resources for an R&D Program 
for a Hydrogen Transition?  What technologies most demand 
improvement?  This question can best be answered by a model or analysis 
that can test the relative sensitivity of hydrogen transition outcomes (e.g. 
hydrogen vehicle penetration or total oil displacement) to different levels of 
success in R&D programs aimed at reducing the costs and improving the 
performance of key hydrogen production, delivery, fueling, and vehicle 
technology systems or improving other aspects of a transition.  Theoretically, 
a simulation model that builds a hydrogen scenario based on market 
conditions and vehicle and fuel costs would most directly capture the effects 
of different levels of R&D success, by showing how R&D success will 
directly affect the rate of growth of hydrogen production and consumption.  
However, simpler models that rely on exogeneously-specified hydrogen 
scenarios will show the effects of different levels of R&D success on total 
investment and operating costs of the specified scenario, giving a strong 
indicator of the scenario’s likelihood of becoming reality.  Multiple runs with 
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different scenarios can be used to obtain a picture of the effect of R&D 
success, though this appears to be a “second best” method. 
 
Note that the added benefit of a simulation model that endogeneously constructs a 
scenario may be limited by gaps in understanding how investors will react to changed 
costs as well as other uncertainties (such as how FCV competitors – conventional 
gasoline and diesel vehicles – will adapt to increased competition, by improving 
performance and reducing costs). 
 
 
4.4 Reality Testing of Scenarios 
Some of the more complex models used to develop hydrogen transition scenarios create 
outcomes that are automatically tested for realism in some respects.  For example, some 
models do not allow fuel production to expand faster than predetermined maximum rates; 
some models base vehicle sales on satisfaction of consumer preferences, that is, they use 
vehicle choice models; and some apply economic tests to investment decisions, that is, 
they demand satisfaction of minimum payback or other requirements.  However, even the 
more complex models do not subject all important decisions to formal computation (for 
example, some key variables may simply be specified by the model user), and the 
majority of scenarios reviewed were developed without complex modeling or other 
processes that would guard against outcomes failing some important reality test.  Given 
this lack of reality testing, it might be useful to develop a set of tests that could be applied 
to hydrogen transition scenarios to identify those with serious flaws. 
 
Short and Greene have discussed* a variety of questions that DOE will need to answer in 
the process of helping to guide the analytic process of designing the Federal 
government’s role in promoting the development of a hydrogen economy.  Many of these 
questions relate directly to evaluating the realism of potential hydrogen transition 
scenarios, and these questions have helped in constructing the following list of issues that 
can be used either to formulate a realistic scenario or to evaluate the realism of a scenario 
after it has been developed: 
 
1. Investor behavior:  
a. For individual investor classes, do the required investments satisfy 
established investment hurdles?  Can we track the initial investments, 
operating costs, and revenues for individual actors (e.g., hydrogen 
producer, vehicle manufacturer, producer of refueling station gear, etc.) to 
explore the attractiveness of these businesses?  For example, for an 
individual investor, can we determine how long it takes to get the project 
into the black and what the rate of return is? 
b. If some of the investments that are implied by a scenario would not 
satisfy normal investment criteria, is it likely that larger investors (e.g. 
multinational oil companies) would recognize this and act to insure 
that the investments would be made anyway, to allow overall program 
                                                 
* Short, W. and Greene, D., “Hydrogen Transition Modeling and Analysis: What are the Questions?,” 
Powerpoint presentation to the H2A Analysis Working Group, July 11, 2003. 
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goals to be met? (For example, might large investors venture into 
temporary support of small-scale hydrogen production appliances to get 
the system started even though these appliances might be replaced before 
they can repay their initial investment?).  Note: identifying unattractive 
individual investments will point the way to targeted government 
incentives to spur these investments without providing unnecessary 
incentives to those actors not requiring them. 
2. Vehicle buyer behavior: Are buyer concerns about vehicle and service 
attributes accounted for in the scenario?  Also, can we account for different 
types of vehicle buyers, e.g. early adopters?  Key buyer concerns may include: 
a. Fuel availability, including redundancy of distribution (e.g., are stations 
only on key highways and widely separated?  If so, what happens if one 
goes out of service?  Have the scenarios taken such factors into account?) 
b. Vehicle price vs. vehicle attributes, with “price” including fuel savings 
or added fuel costs.  Has scenario development used vehicle choice 
models that account for such factors?  If not, do the projected vehicle sales 
in the scenario seem to be reasonable based on the vehicle attributes and 
prices assumed in the scenario? 
c. Likely availability of maintenance services; Will potential vehicle 
purchasers be discouraged by initial lack of competition among service 
providers? 
3. Government policies/actions: Are government policies keyed to overcoming 
specific problems with investor and buyer requirements?  In other words, 
assuming problems are identified regarding shortcomings in vehicle attributes or 
failure of investment opportunities to satisfy investor requirements, are 
government policies designed to overcome these hurdles?  (Of course, scenario 
development can be designed to be a 2-step process, with the purpose of the first 
step to identify areas where government policy changes are required, and the 
second step being the designing of appropriate policies). 
4. Infrastructure: Are the schedules for infrastructure development realistic? 
a. Building hydrogen production plants, fueling stations, pipelines, vehicle 
production lines – accounting not only for normal plant schedules but also 
for system-wide limitations on construction workers, plant designers, etc. 
b. Schedules for training personnel for vehicle maintenance – Are they 
realistic? 
c. Timing of technology improvements/cost reductions – Do they mesh with 
our current understanding of technology “learning”? 
5. Relationship between the underpinnings of a hydrogen economy and the 
specified exogeneous variables 
a. Do the scenario assumptions about oil prices, public attitudes about the 
environment, efficiency of the conventional ICE fleet, etc. (which 
generally are exogeneous variables, not determined within the model – 
assuming a model was used) make sense when coupled with development 
of a hydrogen economy?  For example, if ultra-high-efficiency hydrogen 
vehicles are assumed in the scenario, they shouldn’t be competing against 
low-efficiency conventional vehicles – because the conditions that cause 
  
19 
the hydrogen vehicles to be developed and sold would also cause 
conventional vehicles to become much more efficient.  
b. Does the scenario account for interactions between hydrogen development 
(and the large-scale resource use implied by hydrogen production) and 
resource prices – including a possible drop in oil prices as demand shifts 
to hydrogen.  That is, does the scenario account for interactive effects 
among resources. 
6. Role of stationary hydrogen power and non-transport uses of hydrogen 
feedstocks in a transport scenario – Does the scenario account for hydrogen 
development outside of the transportation sector that might affect hydrogen fuel 
prices, fuel availability, technology development, etc.  For example, development 
of stationary hydrogen power may add hydrogen distribution infrastructure, and 
may allow hydrogen vehicles to “partner” with the facility by refueling there.  
Also, there may be sufficient overlap between development of the technology 
needed for stationary power and vehicle power (especially for hydrogen 
production) to yield synergistic gains, or simply to advance the state of 
technology which the vehicles and their infrastructure can then piggy-back onto.  
Non-transportation sources may also compete with transportation for 
hydrogen feedstocks, either for hydrogen production or other uses.  Further, these 
same feedstocks may alternatively be used to produce other transportation fuels 
such as cellulosic ethanol or Fischer Tropsch diesel.  The effects here may be 
positive or negative depending on scale effects and resource limitations.  As 
noted in the brief discussion of ideal model characteristics, analysts must consider 
alternative uses for potential hydrogen feedstocks, especially because they may 
have stronger benefits in other uses. 
 
 
 
 
4.5 Modeling the Behavior of Investors Facing an Uncertain Future 
Analysts seeking to understand how investments are likely to unfold during a transition to 
hydrogen, or seeking to discover how investors will react to different policy options to 
create or accelerate such a transition will have to simulate the behavior of potential 
vehicle purchasers, vehicle manufacturers, and investors in fuel production and refueling 
infrastructure.  The economic actors actually dealing with a real transition to hydrogen 
will face substantial uncertainty about future economic and resource conditions and may 
search for investment strategies that trade off some profit potential for lower risk.  Under 
such conditions, many of these actors may seek investments that will do reasonably well 
under a wide range of future conditions rather than trying to find investments that will 
yield maximum profits under one “expected” future.  This set of investments may be 
quite different from the set that would emerge from searching for investments that will 
maximize profits for one particular future.  This overall analytic problem is made more 
severe because a hydrogen transition has been identified as a classic chicken-or-egg 
situation – the individual actors who will build different parts of the system don’t know 
for sure whether the others will build their part, so they may fear getting stuck with 
stranded assets (a fuel supply and distribution infrastructure without enough vehicles to 
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use it, or a vehicle manufacturing infrastructure – with many manufactured vehicles -- 
without sufficient fuel infrastructure to provide potential vehicle purchasers with the 
incentive to buy the vehicles).  This intensifies investor uncertainty beyond what 
uncertainties in variables such as oil price would normally create. 
 
The concern here is whether the available models can generate an understanding of likely 
investor behavior, to help develop policies suitable for an environment of high 
uncertainty.  For example, optimization models search for a “best” solution (for example, 
a least cost solution) under specified conditions, sometimes under the assumption that 
investors are acting with perfect foresight of future conditions.  This may provide a 
blueprint of a potential investment path to a least cost future (assuming the scenario is an 
accurate representation of the future), but it doesn’t show how to get there in a free-
market economy.  Insight about investor options might be gained by examining 
alternative futures and finding investment paths that provide profits under a variety of 
conditions.  For example, the MARKAL model can operate in a stochastic mode in which 
the user defines various states of the future, and the model will find the least-cost path for 
a distribution of these states.  However, translating such findings into an accurate 
representation of likely investment behavior (or into selection of optimal policies for 
stimulating a transition) may be difficult. 
 
Dealing with this problem demands that the modeler face some key issues: 
1. There is universal agreement in the analytic community that the future course of 
oil prices and other variables affecting investor behavior is highly uncertain, but 
little agreement about the relative probabilities of different scenarios for these 
variables; 
2. Further, there is little understanding about how potential investors in a hydrogen 
economy view the future; 
3. Neither is there clear understanding of how such investors would behave even if 
we understood what their expectations for the future were.  It is likely that there 
would be a wide range of behavior, even within defined groups such as vehicle 
manufacturers or fuel providers; 
 
The implication here is that the choice of how much detail to put into the model – for 
example, (in modeling investment behavior) whether to treat the entire energy sector as a 
single actor, to disaggregate to the level of the individual firm, or to choose some other 
level of disaggregation – goes beyond the normal choice between simplicity and 
complexity (with simplicity offering lower cost, greater flexibility, and improved ability 
to understand how the model is behaving at the cost of less accuracy, and complexity 
costing more, reducing flexibility and making it more difficult to understand how the 
model is behaving but perhaps offer greater accuracy).  Modelers also have to carefully 
consider just how far our state of knowledge will allow us to go in modeling investor 
behavior under conditions of great uncertainty.  There is a real concern here that analysts 
do not know enough about investor behavior to truly utilize the potential benefits of 
greater model complexity and disaggregation. 
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4.6 A Boundary Issue, and an Actor Issue – How Important Is It to Track 
Individual Actors, Including International/Multinational Ones? 
In the earlier discussions about reality testing of scenarios and the characteristics of an 
“ideal” transition model, the issue of disaggregating the investor community into 
individual actors was raised.  Although most reviewed scenario analyses have focused 
exclusively on the environmental and energy security effects of the scenario (especially 
GHG reduction and oil displacement) and sometimes on the total investment cost, a few 
have tracked total cash flow for the purpose of identifying how long it would take for a 
hydrogen industry to start turning a profit.  This is a form of reality test for the scenario, 
or at least a measure of how much subsidy might have to be provided by government.  
However, these analyses essentially have treated the entire hydrogen industry, 
including vehicle manufacturers, hydrogen producers and distributors, and retail 
fuel sellers as a single entity.  This type of analysis can be quite useful if aimed at 
getting a general idea about the realism of the scenario and government’s role, but it falls 
short of providing a means of testing government policies aimed at individual actors or 
selected groups of actors.  On the other hand, it might prove quite adequate if it is likely 
that large corporate entities will form joint ventures in recognition of the enormous risks 
involved in establishing a hydrogen economy.  In any case, the likely considerable value 
of disaggregating the analysis to examine something more detailed than the “single 
entity” actor should be carefully weighed against the analytical difficulties such 
disaggregation entails.   
 
To carry this discussion a bit further, one of the scenario analyses examined in the 
literature review asserts that the automobile industry has its own “rules” for investing in 
new technology that are somewhat different than those rules observed by other industries.  
This provides some further impetus for strongly considering at least disaggregating 
investors into individual industry sectors. 
 
Another potential benefit of tracking “actors” at a more disaggregated level is the 
possibility that learning effects can be more accurately gauged.  Many scenario analyses 
model the effects of learning and mass production on technology performance and cost 
by establishing rates of decline of technology price dependent on the number of units 
produced, and similar relationships for technology performance.  There are important 
questions in such analyses as to what the appropriate measures of production should be, 
given technology competition (and secrecy) among competing corporations and the 
likelihood that multinational corporations will be extremely important actors in a 
hydrogen economy.  These questions intersect with questions about how learning occurs 
in multi-actor industries and within multinational corporations.  In other words: 
1. Is it reasonable to tie price decline rates to total U.S. production, or should more 
attention be paid to production by individual firms or coalitions. 
2. Can production overseas by multinational corporations operating in the U.S. be 
ignored in such calculations? 
3. Do we know enough about learning to justify worrying about such nuances? 
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4.7 Searching for “Swing” Assumptions 
All modelers dealing with future hydrogen development probably would agree that 
assumptions will play a considerable role in driving the results of their analysis, because 
of the long time frames needed to develop a hydrogen economy, the early state of 
development of several crucial technologies (especially fuel cells and hydrogen storage 
systems), and uncertain consumer reaction to an automotive system with some 
characteristics that are sharply different from the current system.  It probably is a truism 
that a search for those assumptions that combine the potential to strongly influence the 
model outcome and a likelihood that they may turn out to be unrealistic should be done 
for all models, so that users of the results understand their limitations and so that 
appropriate parametric analyses with alternative assumptions be produced.  In the case of 
hydrogen transition modeling, this requirement is magnified. 
 
In the paper by Tseng and Friley, *  for example, gasoline prices are projected to drop in 
response to oversupply as total refinery throughput decreases.  In response to the same 
trend, diesel and petrochemical feedstock prices are projected to increase.  However, this 
outcome depends on the assumption that refiners will not be able to develop technologies 
that can cost-effectively change the output slate, or that refiners will not be willing to 
make the necessary investments in a time of increasing hydrogen penetration of the light-
duty market.  In the Tseng and Friley analysis, the decline in gasoline price causes the 
light-duty fleet to retain a substantial share of conventional drivetrains despite (assumed) 
hybrid drivetrains that are quite inexpensive…a good example of the cascading effects of 
an  assumption that may be quite open to challenge.  An alternative assumption, that 
refining technology adjustments will be available and that appropriate investments to 
modify refineries would be made, would significantly change the modeled outcome.  The 
question of how modeling studies should deal with such “swing” assumptions clearly is 
deserving of significant attention. 
 
 
 
5. A “WISH LIST” OF REQUIREMENTS FOR A HYDROGEN TRANSITION 
MODEL 
The primary goal of this literature review and evaluation is to assist the review of a series 
of hydrogen transition models being sponsored by the Department of Energy and help to 
suggest improvements to these models.  In advance of examining the models’ 
characteristics, it should be useful to construct a template of an “ideal” model – that is, 
one constructed without resource constraints and without limits on model complexity -- 
of a hydrogen transition into the transportation fuels market.  The characteristics of each 
of the DOE-sponsored models can then be compared to this template, recognizing that it 
is unlikely and probably impractical for any individual model to attempt to satisfy all of 
the features of such an “ideal” model, and that this characterization should be dependent 
on the precise purpose of the model, that is, the type of questions the model is designed to 
answer.  Further, as discussed above, model complexity may overwhelm the capacity of 
the modeler to provide adequate data and may hinder the exploration of alternative 
                                                 
* Tseng, P., Lee, J., and Friley, P., “A Hydrogen Economy: Opportunities and Challenges,” Energy, 
Volume 30, Issue 14, 1 November 2005, pp.2703-2720.  
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scenarios.  It seems quite possible that the most practical approach to modeling a 
hydrogen transition will be the development of a few models that will each be focused on 
specific types or ranges of questions and audiences. 
 
The “ideal” model might have the following characteristics (not by order of importance): 
1. Documentation.  Clear documentation, especially a strong description of the 
basic analysis methodology and identification of key embedded variables (what 
they are, and what their default values are); also, to the extent possible, provision 
of an honest evaluation of model sensitivity to starting assumptions, to help users 
properly evaluate the robustness of model output.  Ideally, identification of 
“swing” assumptions – those which will have an especially strong effect on key 
model outputs – will guide the development of a standard list of assumptions that 
will accompany the model’s reporting of each set of scenario results. 
2. Output.  Ability to construct a variety of summary tables and multiple types of 
figures; ideal would be the provision of user ability to define/design the output 
tables and figures – to be able to specify time intervals and variables to be 
graphed or included in tables.  
3. Parametric analysis capability.  Flexibility to allow extensive parametric 
analysis – ease of changing exogeneous variables, with special focus on those 
variables a) to which the results are quite sensitive, and b) which are highly 
variable/controversial.  Some examples: 
a. Assumed oil/gasoline prices 
b. Discount rates 
c. Investment hurdles for different investor classes 
d. Vehicle performance and cost measures (e.g., MPG, total vehicle cost), 
including Baseline vehicles 
e. Other vehicle attributes  
f. Construction schedules 
g. Learning rates for technology cost and performance  
4. Ability to do Monte Carlo simulations using probability distributions for key 
variables.  Given the issue discussed in 13 below, analysts may wish to have the 
capability to model hydrogen pathways over a distribution of future conditions 
(such as oil prices) rather than for just one set of conditions.*  
5. Reasonable level of spatial disaggregation.  Ability to distinguish between 
different geographic circumstances, e.g. rural, suburban, small and large city; and 
different types of resources.  This clearly is crucial because the economics of 
hydrogen systems will vary substantially with factors such as the spatial density 
of vehicles and the type of feedstocks used to produce hydrogen. 
6. Ability to incorporate existing sources of hydrogen into the transitional 
hydrogen supply, including the expansion of existing operating plants and 
reopening of mothballed facilities.  It has become clear that the magnitude of 
existing hydrogen production in the U.S. is quite large, and there is a substantial 
production potential in currently non-operating plants, both of which should be 
                                                 
* To avoid unnecessary application of this capability, the sensitivity of key outputs to changes in (uncertain) 
variables can first be evaluated parametrically, with Monte Carlo capability added only when high 
sensitivity of outputs to the variables is demonstrated. 
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taken into account in a realistic transition scenario.  Ideally, this capability would 
include a detailed representation of refinery processes, technology, and capital 
equipment in place; however, this might prove overly ambitious unless the 
transition model can be linked to an existing model of the industry. 
7. Robust vehicle choice model.  Embedded vehicle choice model with multiple 
buyer groups or use of a distribution of buyer preferences and characteristics and 
a full range of competing vehicle and fuel technologies, including advanced 
conventional vehicles, electric hybrids, etc.  The first buyers of hydrogen vehicles 
(aside from government agencies and fleets) are likely to be “early adopters,” who 
have markedly different characteristics than average vehicle buyers, and buyer 
characteristics will change over time as hydrogen vehicles grow in numbers, the 
hydrogen infrastructure expands, and vehicle prices change (with learning and 
mass production effects).  A major roadblock here is limitations in the state-of-
knowledge of vehicle purchase decisions. 
8. Scenario reality checks -- tracking.  Ability to track variables that can help 
measure scenario realism, e.g. cash flow for key investors, labor requirements for 
infrastructure construction (User should be able to specify these variables as 
output).  This might require the model to be able to disaggregate the cash flow of 
individual investment “actors.”  The model should be able to address the 
question, “Would individual investors be willing to invest in this activity?,”  with 
regard to the multiple types of investments needed to construct a hydrogen 
system. 
9. Scenario reality checks – algorithms.  The model should contain algorithms that 
add to scenario realism either by automatically adjusting parameter values to 
avoid unrealistic values or by alerting the user when such values occur, e.g. 
a. Limits on the construction rates of large hydrogen production plants, the 
rate of buildup of the required labor force, etc. (alternative: user alerts 
when embedded maximum values are exceeded) 
b. Avoidance of treating dependent variables as if they were independent (or 
at least incorporating algorithms that check relationships among variables 
to avoid large anomalies).  An example would be treating hydrogen use 
and gasoline price as if they were independent of each other, rather than 
considering that large-scale penetration of hydrogen into the transportation 
market could depress gasoline prices. 
10. Wide analytic boundaries.  Consideration of non-transport factors affecting 
hydrogen use in transport, e.g. hydrogen use in stationary power generation or 
residential energy services, or non-transport competition for hydrogen feedstocks.  
Also, the model should be capable of evaluating how hydrogen use in the 
transport sector can affect the rest of the energy sector and the economy as a 
whole, for example, by raising demand for hydrogen feedstocks and reducing 
demand for competing transportation fuels.  In addition, in measuring GHG 
impacts, the model needs to properly attribute electricity used for electrolysis to 
the appropriate marginal power sources, and compare the GHG effects to those 
that would occur from an alternative use of that power if it is renewable.  Some 
scenario analyses have used national average power generation or assumptions of 
a single power source as the “marginal” source, but the actual marginal source 
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may be quite different, and the validity of the GHG calculations depend critically 
on correctly identifying that source (or distribution of sources).  A number of 
scenario analyses have concluded that the use of renewable electricity to generate 
hydrogen for fuel cell vehicles will save considerably less GHG emissions than 
using the electricity to back out fossil power, especially coal-fired generation.  A 
final issue is geographic boundaries, since learning and mass production effects 
may apply across a wide geographic area, perhaps worldwide in some cases. 
11. Ability to model a variety of government policies.  This attribute is not really 
separate from the others, since government policies generally affect model 
variables such as costs (because of direct subsidies or R&D assistance), interest 
rates (because of loan guarantees), etc…..so the key to successful modeling is 
likely to be the ability to readily change variables (that is, attribute 3) or even 
basic relationships (attribute 12).  However, highly aggregated models will have 
trouble modeling policies that are narrowly targeted to industry segments (e.g., 
very small scale hydrogen appliances) or geographic areas (e.g., rural areas).  
Models assuming perfect foresight may have trouble capturing the effects of 
government fuel price guarantees, though presumably the modelers will use 
proxies of the effect of reduced uncertainty, e.g. reduced hurdle rates, to simulate 
the effects of such guarantees.  
12. Modular structure.  The model should have a modular structure that allows 
submodels to be easily updated or replaced as new knowledge is gained about 
industry investment behavior, factors affecting technology cost, and so forth.  
13. Appropriate investment model, including investment rules and 
disaggregation of types of investors.  As discussed above, choosing an 
appropriate level of disaggregation for describing investors, selecting an 
appropriate investment model, and defining the rules for that model is made 
difficult by incomplete understanding of investment behavior under conditions of 
high uncertainty about future oil prices, significant technological uncertainty, and 
strong dependency of investment success on the investment behavior of other 
actors.  Some models have chosen to use optimization algorithms programmed to 
maximize the Net Present Value of future investments and costs to achieve 
specified levels of hydrogen consumption.  These models may start with an 
exogeneously-specified demand profile and search for least-cost solutions to meet 
that demand, perhaps assuming perfect foresight on the part of investors.  Other 
models may take the same least-cost approach, but compute a hydrogen demand 
profile by integrating the supply and demand parts of the model.  Rules other than 
optimization may also guide investment decisions.  And instead of perfect 
foresight, decisions may be made on the basis of “myopic” foresight (investors 
base decisions on expectations that current prices will continue), or using 
probability distributions for future oil prices and other key variables.  The level of 
disaggregation may range from treating the entire energy system as a single actor 
to evaluating the behavior of individual firms in separate vehicle manufacturing, 
fuel production, and fuel distribution sectors.   
We are not prepared to identify an “optimal” investment model for 
hydrogen transition models, because of the difficult tradeoffs discussed above.  
The best we can say here is that different investment models answer different 
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questions, and it is extremely important that both modeler and client understand 
what question the model is actually addressing, the basic underlying assumptions 
of the model, and its limitations.  As noted earlier, an optimization model 
identifying a least cost solution for a projected oil price path defines an optimal 
investment path (assuming the price forecast is correct), but doesn’t predict the 
path investors will actually take.  Although it seems possible that multiple runs of 
such models, under different scenarios, may allow a more realistic picture of 
likely investor behavior to emerge, it is necessary that a methodology for doing so 
be explicitly defined.  And simulation models, while actually projecting investor 
behavior, do so with the limitation that there may be incomplete understanding of 
the rules real-world firms will follow during a hydrogen transition.  Further, as 
discussed above, there appears to be a dissonance between simple model 
characterizations of investors’ view of the future (e.g., perfect foresight, “myopia) 
and actual investor behavior, and this dissonance is not likely to be overcome by 
analysis procedures such as increasing hurdle rates when investor uncertainty is 
high.  
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6. RESULTS OF THE MODEL REVIEW 
6.1 Introduction  
A primary goal of this study is to use the insights gained from the literature review to 
help strengthen the Department of Energy’s hydrogen transition modeling effort.  To 
complete this effort, it was necessary to understand how each of the three models dealt 
with the issues raised in the review, to discover, for example, how the models treat the 
various actors who will influence the hydrogen transition, or how the models treat the 
process of technology learning.  Because the available model documentation is extremely 
lengthy and complex, and the models are still being developed and thus are in transition, 
the most efficient way to gain the necessary understanding was to recruit the modelers 
themselves to provide the needed model descriptions.  To assist in this process, a 
questionnaire based on the insights gained in the literature review was sent to the 
modeling teams developing and running the three hydrogen models.  The questions focus 
on the key issues discussed in the previous sections, and aim to ferret out how each of the 
models deals with these issues.  The modelers – primarily David Greene and Paul Leiby 
of Oak Ridge National Laboratory (HyTrans), Frances Wood of OnLocation, Inc. 
(NEMS-H2), and Chip Friley of Brookhaven National Laboratory (MARKAL/DOE) -- 
were extremely generous in contributing their time and expertise to answer our questions.  
Table 2 presents the combined results of the questionnaires (some of the answers have 
been edited for clarification or altered based on follow-up conversations with the 
modelers). 
 
In interpreting the results of the questionnaires in the context of the insights gained by the 
literature review, it is important to recognize that model design involves a tradeoff among 
competing factors, including basic analytic goals, model complexity, and the ease of 
interpreting results and recognizing the limitations of particular analyses.  Analytic goals 
may directly compete with each other.  For example, integrating various parts of the 
energy sector (to learn how changes in one part of the sector affect other parts, e.g., how 
changes in energy efficiency affect energy prices) may limit the model’s ability to 
evaluate specific future scenarios -- the relationships among the key variables may make 
it impossible to replicate a particular scenario in the model, although trial and error may 
make it possible to approximate a scenario.  Further, a desire to model certain interactions 
may be stymied by limitations in our basic scientific understanding of the interactions 
rather than by a lack of pure modeling capability.  Selecting how to trade off these 
competing values requires an intimate understanding of the subject matter, the state of the 
art of energy modeling, and the needs of the Department of Energy (or any client); this 
level of understanding goes beyond the scope of this analysis.  Consequently, rather than 
making recommendations for specific actions, this discussion attempts only to point out, 
for consideration by the modelers and their sponsors, some potential areas where 
modeling changes might strengthen the models’ ability to help understand a hydrogen 
transition.  These areas are discussed below: 
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Table  2.     Expanded Hydrogen Modeling Comparison 
 
 
 Questions for Hydrogen 
Modelers 
NEMS-H2  HyTrans MARKAL  
 
Purpose State what the purpose(s) of 
the model is (are), stressing 
those that have shaped how 
the model is formulated. 
 
NEMS was designed by EIA to 
project the energy, economic, and 
environmental impacts of alternative 
energy policies and of different 
assumptions about energy markets.  
NEMS-H2 builds on that model to 
analyze hydrogen futures under 
various conditions and policies, 
especially the impact of a hydrogen 
economy on the U.S. energy system. 
HyTrans purpose is to represent 
the interactions of consumers 
(vehicle purchasers and users), 
fuel suppliers (from hydrogen 
producers to retailers) and 
vehicle manufacturers in the 
market, in order to create 
realistic scenarios of the 
transitions to hydrogen-powered 
light-duty vehicles, explore the 
roles of advanced technologies 
in transitions, analyze the 
impacts of policies on the 
transition and evaluate the 
economic costs and benefits of 
achieving a transition to 
hydrogen. 
MARKAL was developed to analyze 
the role of technologies in energy 
system and environmental planning and 
policy analysis.  The hydrogen portion 
of the model was developed as a part of 
the GPRA analysis-and has focused on 
technologies where U.S. DOE R&D 
efforts have been focused. 
Time Horizon  Currently 2030, to be extended to 
2050, annual increments 
2000 to 2050 in 5-year 
increments 
2000 to 2050 in 5-year increments 
Geographic 
Differentiation 
 9 Census regions with 3 markets 
(different rural/urban classifications) 
defined within each. 
3 geographic regions (West, 
Northeast, Rest of US) and 3 
subregions within each (different 
densities of demand) 
U.S. as a single region 
Model 
Output(s) 
- Which variables 
(dependent and 
independent) does the 
model output include, as a 
default (focus only on 
variables relevant to the 
Hydrogen production by technology, 
market, and Census division, fuel cell 
vehicle sales and stock shares, fuel 
cell vehicle prices and efficiencies, 
hydrogen consumption, hydrogen 
prices by market and region, fuels 
consumed for hydrogen production 
and delivery, carbon dioxide 
The model predicts the 
following key variables 
endogenously over the period 
2005 to 2050: 
The market price of hydrogen by 
region; 
Hydrogen quantities produced 
by process, feedstock and 
Model projects fuel cell vehicle market 
shares and hydrogen consumption, 
production of hydrogen by technology, 
cost of hydrogen and competing fuels, 
feedstock consumption for hydrogen 
production and related carbon 
emissions. The model will also track 
total energy system costs and the 
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hydrogen transition)?  
 
emissions associated with hydrogen 
production.   
region; 
New LDV vehicle sales by 
technology and fuel type; 
The market prices of LDV by 
technology and fuel type; 
Vehicle stock and vehicle travel 
by technology and fuel type; 
The number of refueling outlets 
by region; 
The number of makes and 
models by technology and fuel 
type; 
Capital investment in production 
by process and region; 
Capital investment in delivery 
infrastructure by type and 
region; 
Gasoline displacement, GHG 
emissions, and various cost 
measures. 
 
displacement of other fuels.  At present, 
the U.S. is treated as a single region; 
use of census regions and 
urban/rural/suburban segmentation are 
being pursued. 
 - Can the output be user-
specified?  If so, what 
additional variables can be 
added? 
 
More detailed information is 
available for debugging purposes, 
such as components of hydrogen 
prices, hydrogen fuel availability 
Yes.  So far most of HyTrans 
development effort has been on 
model structure, not user 
interface.  But an enormous 
range of tabular results and 
graphs are generated with post-
processing commands. 
MARKAL has standardized output 
tables that should cover most data 
related to hydrogen production, 
distribution and consumption. Most (if 
not all) of the output from model 
calculations are available in the output 
file. 
 - For user-specification of 
output, how difficult is it to 
change output variables?  
Briefly describe what the 
user has to do. 
 
Variables in model would need to be 
identified and added to intermediate 
output files (not easy for non-NEMS 
user). 
For many variables there are 
switches in a text file that can be 
changed readily before executing 
a model run. 
Other variables can be created 
by editing the GAMS code. 
It is relatively difficult to change the 
MARKAL output files.  However, 
more information about technologies 
and the details of their penetration can 
be obtained by running scenarios with 
and without the technology (this 
applies to all the models 
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 Questions for Hydrogen 
Modelers 
NEMS-H2  HyTrans MARKAL  
 
Parametric 
analysis 
capability 
Describe how the model is 
set up to do parametric 
analysis.  How easy is it to 
change the following 
variables (that is, do you 
have to rewrite code? Are 
there simple user prompts?): 
 
NEMS-H2 does not have a GUI 
interface. Inputs are changed through 
relevant input files for the HMM or 
transportation model. 
In general, changes to input data 
and parameters require either 
changes to a spreadsheet file or 
editing a text file. 
MARKAL’s data inputs can be 
changed relatively easily through the 
ANSWER interface.  The EPA-RTP 
group has developed techniques to 
automate sensitivity analysis.  We have 
taken preliminary steps to incorporate 
these techniques.   
 - Assumed future oil and 
gasoline prices  
 
Generally solved for endogenously 
within NEMS-H2.  Relatively easy to 
run alternative world oil price cases.  
HMM and transportation can be run 
together without rest of model and 
delivered oil prices specified through 
input files, but it is not very easy for 
a non-NEMS modeler to do.  If this 
were going to be a routine use, new 
input price streams could be 
established. 
Each of the standard AEO oil 
price cases (High, Mid, Low) 
with associated oil, gasoline and 
other prices are selectable with a 
switch.  Other paths may be 
entered.  
Oil prices are determined 
endogenously, although the user can 
easily adjust prices by changing the 
supply curves or by applying a cost 
multiplier or additional cost adder to oil 
or gasoline prices. 
 - Discount rates 
 
Specified in an input file A single parameter in the data 
file. 
Discount rates can be changed for 
individual technologies 
 - Vehicle performance and 
cost, including baseline 
vehicles 
 
Conventional gasoline vehicle 
characteristics are endogenously 
derived.  FC vehicle characteristics 
can be user specified as relative to 
the conventional vehicle (incremental 
cost and mpg multiplier). 
Changes are made to a 
spreadsheet which produces an 
input table for HyTrans. 
Vehicle capital and O&M costs and 
vehicle fuel efficiencies can be changed 
 - Learning rates for 
technology cost and 
performance 
 
Learning has not yet been 
incorporated for hydrogen production 
and FC vehicle technologies. but is 
planned for the next version. 
Changes made to spreadsheet, 
which are then exported to 
HyTrans 
MARKAL can only be run with 
technology learning for costs .  The use 
of technology learning is a user choice 
and the user can adjust the learning 
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rates. 
 - Plant construction times 
 
These are implied in the installed 
costs. 
NA Construction times are not an input in 
MARKAL.  The user can model the 
capital cost reduction (due to reduced 
capitalized interest) exogenously and 
then adjust the MARKAL investment 
cost parameter.   
 - Other variables (list) 
 
Vehicle make and model availability 
can be user specified 
Many.  
Monte Carlo 
capability 
Is the model set up to do 
Monte Carlo analysis?  If 
so, for which variables? 
 
No. No. This can be done using the EPA-RTP 
group’s techniques, for all input 
variables. 
Existing 
sources/plants 
Does the model’s data base 
of hydrogen sources include 
existing sources/plants? 
 
No.  Existing hydrogen production 
for refinery use is included in 
NEMS-H2 but is not available for 
meeting non-refinery demands.  
At present, only for region 9. We 
are in the process of adding 
these data for all regions. 
No 
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 Questions for Hydrogen 
Modelers 
NEMS-H2  HyTrans MARKAL  
 
Vehicle choice 
model 
 
Is there an embedded 
vehicle choice model?   
 
 
Yes.  It has a multi-attribute nested 
logit model. 
Yes, a nested multinomial logit 
model. 
No formal vehicle choice model.  New 
vehicles penetrate based on economic 
tradeoffs of vehicle cost, O&M cost, 
fuel consumption, etc. within the 
context of the energy system, tempered 
by limits on penetration rates.  
 Does the model have one or 
multiple representations of 
buyers (e.g., early adopters, 
mainstream buyers)?  If 
there are multiple buyer 
groups, describe what they 
are. 
 
Vehicle buyers are treated as a 
distribution through the logit 
function. 
Buyers are represented by a 
probability distribution of 
individual-specific utilities and a 
shared typical utility function.  
Early adopters are therefore in 
the tail of the distribution. 
We do not currently model different 
buyer types.  This could be done by 
breaking transportation demands into 
different categories and using separate 
hurdle rates for each group.  
 Do the buyers take account 
of fuel availability and 
availability of vehicle 
maintenance services in 
their purchase decisions?  If 
yes, briefly describe how. 
 
Yes for fuel availability.  Low fuel 
availability decreases consumer 
“utility” and therefore reduces 
market share for those vehicles. The 
function imposes a steep penalty for 
very low availability, but little 
penalty once availability reaches 
around 10%. 
Yes.  Fuel availability is an 
explicit variable in the 
representative consumer utility 
function.  The value of fuel 
availability is derived from the 
value of time saved by not 
traveling as far to obtain fuel.  
Maintenance costs are included 
but not the availability of 
maintenance service. 
No 
Scenario 
Reality Testing 
Does the model implicitly 
or explicitly take account of 
the following limitations on 
how the scenarios develop? 
 
   
 - Limits on plant Not in current version. Maximum expansion rates for 
production of each vehicle and 
Limits on plant construction schedules 
would be implicit in the initial 
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construction schedules; 
 
fuel type are specifiable.   technology start date and growth bound 
parameters. 
 - (If the model is not 
integrated with the rest of 
the economy,) the effects of 
growing vehicular hydrogen 
use on gasoline prices and 
hydrogen feedstock costs 
 
Included since model is integrated. There are feedstock and motor 
fuel supply curves derived from 
NEMS model runs. As demand 
for feedstocks increases, the 
price is bid up. 
The model is integrated with the rest of 
the economy. 
 - The need for the required 
investments to satisfy 
established investment 
hurdles (Describe how the 
hurdles are applied….to the 
hydrogen industry as a 
single entity, to individual 
actors or groups of actors?). 
 
Investment hurdle rates are 
incorporated in determining 
hydrogen production and delivery 
costs.  Production and delivery each 
treated as single entity.  Hurdle rate 
on vehicle purchases (and implicitly 
manufacture) treated by vehicle 
choice coefficients. 
Investment hurdle rates are 
implicit in the cost functions for 
hydrogen production and 
delivery processes. These 
functions have been derived as 
reduced form equations 
representing the H2A production 
and delivery models.  Individual 
actors are (all) fuel suppliers; 
vehicle manufacturers; 
consumers.  Although individual 
vehicle manufacturing plants and 
fuel production plants (with 
different sizes for the latter) are 
represented, the only differences 
that arise among them are due to 
market conditions, not to 
differences in the “actors.” 
Hurdle rates are applied for individual 
technologies and can be adjusted 
separately for each production and 
distribution technology.  The energy 
sector is treated as a single actor. 
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 Questions for Hydrogen 
Modelers 
NEMS-H2  HyTrans MARKAL  
 
Electrolysis 
GHG 
Emissions 
In calculating the GHG 
impacts of producing 
hydrogen using electrolysis, 
how are the marginal 
electricity sources 
determined? 
Endogenously within the electricity 
model of NEMS-H2 
Marginal electricity impacts are 
embodied in GREET model 
coefficients used to calculate 
GHG impacts, which can be 
changed based on different 
assumptions about the marginal 
electricity mix. 
GHG impacts are determined 
endogenously in the model, on a 
national basis (no regional breakdown).  
Marginal electricity selected based on 3 
seasons and 2 daily time slices. 
“Learning” 
effects on cost 
and 
performance 
Does the model examine 
non-transport uses of 
hydrogen, and are these 
included in calculations of 
learning effects? 
 
Non-transport uses are not included 
in the first version of NEMS-H2.  
Later versions may include stationary 
fuel cells.  Refinery hydrogen 
demand is included, but the hydrogen 
is not available to the transport 
sector. 
Not included in the current 
version. 
U.S. model does not currently model 
non-transport use of hydrogen.   
 Is the learning calculation 
based on total units 
built/sold, or sales by 
smaller entities than “the 
industry” (treated as if it 
were a single entity?)?  
Explain. 
 
Not yet incorporated.  Likely to be 
done based on total units. 
At present, HyTrans includes 
learning (and unlearning) for 
vehicle production.  The current 
version treats drivetrains as the 
learning unit, with industry-wide 
learning.  The next generation 
now under development treats 
components (batteries, on-board 
hydrogen storage, fuel cell 
stacks, motors and controllers, 
etc.) as the learning units. 
Learning in H2 production and 
delivery will be included in the 
next generation. 
Learning would be calculated based on 
total units 
 Are international sales (or 
production) included in 
equations of learning 
effects, or only U.S. sales 
Not yet incorporated.  Likely to be 
done based on US sales, although 
international sales could be 
considered. 
International sales of vehicles 
will be included in the learning 
effects in the next generation.  
The U.S. model would only be able to 
endogenously model learning for U.S. 
sales only.  Global MARKAL type 
models (i.e. SAGE or ETP) could 
model learning effects of total 
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(or production)? 
 
international sales  
Modularity Does the model have a 
modular structure?  Explain.  
 
Yes.  NEM-H2 is modular.  Each of 
the major demand, supply, and 
conversion sectors is represented by 
a model within NEMS (see NEMS 
documentation for more info).  A 
new Hydrogen Market module has 
been added. 
The model is modular in the 
following sense: generalized 
functions are defined for sets of 
processes and activities: vehicle 
types, hydrogen 
production/delivery pathways, 
feedstock and fuel supplies, and 
for regions and years (periods) in 
the model.   
Yes and no.  The model is not modular, 
however, the inputs for individual 
sectors or groups of technologies can 
be entered into separate input files and 
the model can be run with or without 
these input files.. 
 How easy is it to “swap out” 
submodules, to update the 
model? 
 
Relatively easy as long as all 
variables communicating with rest of 
NEMS-H2 remain unchanged.  It is 
easy to run only a subset of models 
and use a previously saved database 
for variables that usually are from 
models not being run. 
Adding a new region, 
technology, fuel, H2 production 
or delivery pathway etc. within 
those sets is simply a matter of 
naming the new 
region/process/fuel and adding 
the needed parameters to tables. 
Very easy 
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 Questions for Hydrogen 
Modelers 
NEMS-H2  HyTrans MARKAL  
 
Objective 
function for 
optimization 
analysis 
If the model incorporates 
optimization routines, 
describe the default 
optimization function.  
 
NEMS-H2 overall is a simulation, 
rather than a global optimization 
model. The HMM uses an 
optimization routine, where the 
objective function is to minimize the 
cost of producing and delivering 
hydrogen  to markets within regions. 
The model optimizes societal 
welfare, as would a competitive 
market (i.e., the discounted sum 
of consumers’ and producers’ 
surplus), over the time horizon 
of the model.   
 
GAMS allows a variety of 
optimization routines (software) 
to be used. 
Least cost optimization 
 Is there flexibility in choice 
of the objective function?  If 
yes, what are the other 
options?   
 
The HMM objective function could 
be modified for future versions.. 
The objective can be varied from 
a private/market perspective to a 
societal perspective by the 
inclusion of “external” 
valuations of oil use or GHG 
emissions.  The modelers are 
developing alternative objective 
functions that deviate from 
complete knowledge. 
The objective function can be adjusted 
to include an environmental damage 
function.  Also, the model has a 
“Modeling to Generate Alternatives” 
mode that generates a variety of 
solutions within a user-specified cost 
increment of the least cost that meet all 
other modeled constraints. 
 Does the model allow the 
trading off of risks and 
rewards (profits, time to 
payback, etc.)?  Explain.   
 
For hydrogen production and 
delivery these are implicitly included 
through the framework for 
calculating annualized capital 
recovery requirements.  For vehicle 
purchases, trade-offs are implicitly 
included through the consumer 
preference coefficients related to 
vehicle cost and cost of driving. 
Yes.  Profits in different future 
time periods are traded-off 
according to a user-specified 
discount rate. 
This would be done by adjusting the 
technology specific hurdle rates 
 Does the model assume 
perfect foresight on the part 
of investors?  If not, explain 
how their uncertainty about 
The Hydrogen Supply Module 
assumes perfect foresight, though 
some other NEMS demand modules 
assume myopic foresight whereby 
decisions are made based on current 
The current version assumes 
perfect foresight. The next 
generation will also allow 
limited foresight over a specified 
time horizon. 
MARKAL can be run with perfect 
foresight or myopically.  There is also a 
stochastic version of the model  
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future outcomes is dealt 
with. 
 
conditions.  The NEMS electricity 
module also uses perfect foresight. 
One actor or 
multiple 
actors? 
Does the model deal with a 
single “industry” or multiple 
actors?   
 
 
Each sector (e.g. hydrogen 
production, vehicle purchaser, etc.) is 
treated as an actor. 
As described above, the model 
represents endogenously all the 
key private actors in the market.  
Government actions are 
represented by policies specified 
by the user (e.g., taxes, 
subsidies, regulatory standards, 
etc.)  Within the automotive and 
H2 production sectors individual 
plants are represented, and there 
are H2 production plants of 
different sizes; as noted, 
however, all vehicle 
manufacturing plants or all fuel 
production facilities will respond 
identically to market conditions. 
MARKAL optimizes over the entire 
energy system.   
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 Questions for Hydrogen 
Modelers 
NEMS-H2  HyTrans MARKAL  
 
Incorporation 
of other 
alternatives to 
gasoline besides 
hydrogen, e.g. 
cellulosic 
ethanol   
Does the model have 
hydrogen competing against 
other alternatives to 
gasoline?   
 
 
The transportation model include 
other LDV types:  diesel, gasoline-
electric hybrids, diesel-electric 
hybrids, dedicated electric, ethanol 
flex, ethanol dedicated, methanol 
flex, methanol dedicated, CNG, CNG 
Bi-fuel, LPG, LPG Bi-fuel fuel cell 
gasoline 
Yes. There are a variety of 
alternative vehicle technologies, 
including gasoline and diesel 
ICEs, gasoline and diesel hybrid 
vehicles and hydrogen ICE 
vehicles.  Technologies for other 
alternative fuels and vehicles 
(ethanol, CNG, LPG) are 
currently de-activated, allowing 
a greater focus on hydrogen. 
MARKAL currently models 
conventional and hybrid gasoline 
vehicles, advanced diesel and hybrid 
diesel vehicles, plug in hybrids, as well 
as CNG and electric vehicles.  Ethanol 
blends in gasoline can currently be 
adjusted up to 85%. 
 Explain how they are 
examined, if in a different 
manner than hydrogen is. 
Only hydrogen vehicles are 
segmented for 3 markets within each 
Census Division. 
All are treated in the same 
manner: each fuel must be 
supplied, offered at some 
fraction of retail sites, and 
compatible vehicles must be 
produced according to similar 
learning, scale and model 
diversity considerations.  
These are examined in the same way. 
Policies Which specific policies can 
be examined by the model?  
Please list them.   
 
Various types of hydrogen 
technology tax incentives and 
subsidies; fuel price taxes, carbon 
emission taxes or caps, improved 
technology through R&D 
Vehicle taxes and subsidies. 
Fuel taxes and subsidies. 
Investment subsidies (production 
or retail). 
Fuel economy standards 
(including CAFE credits for 
special vehicle technologies). 
Alternative fuel or vehicle sales 
mandates. 
Carbon taxes or carbon 
emissions standards. 
Tax incentives (both consumer and 
producer), rebates amd feebates.  
environmental restrictions (CO2) and 
R&D induced technology 
improvements.  EPA’s version can 
model restrictions on criteria pollutant 
emissions. 
 Which policies can be 
examined only indirectly, 
please explain.   
 R&D policies/investments are 
modeled via impacts on the rate 
and extent of technological 
progress (which is explicitly 
Policies not stated above may only be 
examined indirectly. 
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 represented). 
Education and public 
information. 
Codes and standards (through 
vehicle and fuel costs). 
 
Citations and websites that document the working of the models 
 
Documentation for the MARKAL Family of Models, October 2004. 
http://www.etsap.org/documentation.asp 
http://www.etsap.org/Tools.asp
 
Additional information on the U.S. MARKAL model can be found from the EERE GPRA documentation reports 
(http://www1.eere.energy.gov/ba/pba/gpra.html) 
 
Conceptual Design for Representing Hydrogen in NEMS, December 2004 
Documentation of Beta 1.0 version of NEMS-H2, March 2006. 
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6.2 Parametric Analysis 
For all three models, conducting parametric analyses requires manually rerunning the 
models, with each new model run containing changes in the values being evaluated.  This 
will not stop parametric analyses from being conducted, but will make these analyses a 
bit more difficult to conduct and might discourage a full array of them from being 
undertaken.  This is potentially an important issue because many of the key variables in 
hydrogen transition analysis are highly uncertain and because evaluating potential 
policies for assisting the transition will require the systematic evaluation of several levels 
of application to find “best” solutions.  EPA is using a free, publicly available modeling 
framework for doing parametric sensitivity analysis* with MARKAL; this framework 
may be applicable to the other models. 
 
6.3 Monte Carlo Capability 
In a model, a Monte Carlo capability signifies the model’s ability to substitute a 
probability distribution for a single-value parameter and conduct random sampling of the 
distribution to construct a solution in the form of another probability distribution.  In 
other words, the modeler may substitute a probability distribution of possible world oil 
prices for a single price value and then run the model multiple times sampling the 
distribution randomly, each time generating a different solution depending on the 
particular oil price associated with that solution.  One output of the model, e.g. hydrogen 
production for transportation in the year 2045, will vary depending on oil price, so the 
complete set of solutions will yield a probability distribution of hydrogen production.  As 
with parametric analysis capability, discussed above, the high level of uncertainty of key 
parameters driving a transition to hydrogen places a high value on the ability to deal with 
this uncertainty, and Monte Carlo capability will be valuable where there is some 
understanding of how likely different parameter values might be.  Currently, among the 
three models, only MARKAL has incorporated Monte Carlo capability – not as part of 
the model, but in operating the model as part of EPA’s Multimedia Integrated Modeling 
System (MIMS). 
 
6.4 “Learning” as a Driver of Cost Reduction and Performance Enhancement 
It is widely recognized that a transition to hydrogen will involve massive changes in 
vehicles and infrastructure, beginning with many costly technologies that will experience 
cost reductions and improved performance over time.  The cost reductions and improved 
performance will result from gradual improvements associated with experience gained 
from increasing production of the new technologies, with redesigns both of the 
technologies and their means of manufacture.  NEMS-H2 as of yet does not attempt to 
model learning.  HyTrans and MARKAL do model learning, although the learning effects 
in MARKAL are confined to cost reduction.†  In HyTrans, learning proceeds according 
to the number of drivetrains produced; the next version will track learning according to 
                                                 
* Personal communication, Dan Loughlin, USEPA. 
† Learning effects can, of course, be simulated outside the model by changing input variables -- increasing 
efficiency and reducing cost over time.  This could allow, for example, an examination of the relative 
importance of learning compared to other factors in determining commercial success of alternative 
technologies.  However, the value of simulating learning effects this way is limited, because this will not 
allow the model to award learning benefits selectively, i.e. only to technologies that are penetrating the 
market as a scenario evolves and proportionately according to their production rate. 
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the number of individual components produced, which will allow learning effects to be 
captured across different types of drivetrains that may use some of the same components, 
e.g. advanced batteries or electric motors.  MARKAL tracks learning according to the 
total units sold, which appears to be similar or identical to the current HyTrans approach.  
Both MARKAL and HyTrans track drivetrains or units on an industry-wide basis in the 
United States, which implicitly assumes that learning is fungible across companies and 
ignores learning effects that may occur on a worldwide basis by multinational 
corporations.  Although this approach might be challenged, other approaches such as 
tracking by company might be difficult (because design and manufacturing of 
components may be handled either by vehicle manufacturers or by suppliers serving 
multiple manufacturers) and because our understanding of learning effects is still 
evolving.  Nevertheless, learning is a crucial driver of the cost reductions and 
performance improvements that must occur for a hydrogen transition to succeed, and it 
would be worthwhile for the modelers to focus attention on improving the models’ 
handling of learning effects. 
 
 
6.5 Contribution of Existing H2 Sources 
Current production of hydrogen in the U.S. economy is quite large, with primary usage 
for upgrading oil feedstocks in petroleum refineries and for producing fertilizer.  Current 
high natural gas prices have caused substantial fertilizer capacity to be shut in, and there 
is excess hydrogen capacity.  Some analysts have projected that current hydrogen 
capacity may play an important role in a transition to hydrogen use in the transportation 
sector, though such a role will depend on the future of domestic fertilizer manufacturing 
and future trends in petroleum refining, and remains somewhat uncertain.  Only the 
HyTrans model accounts for any current hydrogen production capability in examining a 
future transition, and this capability currently is restricted to Region 9 (but will likely be 
expanded).   
 
6.6 Stationary Source Fuel Cell/Hydrogen Use 
As noted earlier, non-transport use of fuel cells and hydrogen may allow some 
development of hydrogen delivery infrastructure or directly provide a refueling source for 
vehicles connected to the facility.  Non-transport use may also promote some learning 
benefits applicable to transport use, e.g. in fuel handling and safety.  At present, none of 
the three models incorporate non-transport hydrogen use.  This appears to be an area that 
deserves further study. 
 
6.7 Competition for Hydrogen Feedstocks 
Hydrogen production will use feedstocks – natural gas, coal, biomass – that will have 
demand from other sources, some for competing transportation fuels and some for non-
transport energy uses or for chemicals or fertilizer.  MARKAL and NEMS include the 
entire energy system and can track feedstock use for all energy sectors, but may not track 
feedstock demand from non-energy sources.  HyTrans can track feedstock use for 
competing transportation fuels, but cannot track other uses.  This capability or lack of it 
may be important for biomass, if biomass becomes a cornerstone of a hydrogen transition 
strategy for greenhouse gas reasons.  It will also be important for hydrogen production 
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from natural gas, which is used primarily in the non-transport sectors and has 
encountered supply issues.  
 
 
 
6.8 Investment Hurdles and Disaggregation of Investors 
All three of the models apply profitability tests to potential investments, with only those 
investments that satisfy the tests becoming part of the transition scenarios developed.  In 
reality, a variety of private and public entities may make such investments and will apply 
appropriate tests to their investment decisions, e.g. federal agencies, individuals (for 
vehicle purchase decisions), large multinational corporations (for major fuel production 
facilities construction), and so forth.  None of the three models examines such 
investments at the level of all types of investors, but the degree of disaggregation varies 
substantially among the three.  NEMS treats all hydrogen fuel producers as a single 
entity, with all companies involved in fuel delivery as another, separate entity.  
MARKAL generally treats the entire energy sector as if it were the sole investor.  
HyTrans does examine fuel producers and vehicle manufacturers at the individual plant 
level, although the representations of such plants are generic – each would respond 
identically to the same market conditions.  The key concern here is whether the models 
can accurately portray investment decisions by different segments of the industry with 
such a high level of aggregation, and whether further disaggregation of existing models is 
warranted. 
 
6.9 Analysis of Electrolytic Hydrogen Production 
Although electrolysis is projected to be an expensive means to produce hydrogen, high 
natural gas costs and regional differences suggest that electrolysis could play an 
important role in some areas.  The impacts of electrolytic production very much depend 
on which source of electricity is used – that is, given this production, which electricity 
source increases at the margin (that is, the generator used to actually produce the 
hydrogen may not be the marginal source).  Identifying the true marginal source requires 
a detailed, disaggregated generation model.  NEMS uses such a model, disaggregated to 
the level of individual regions.  MARKAL uses a generation model, but it is a national 
model, and its temporal disaggregation is only to the level of three seasons and 2 time 
slices per day.*  HyTrans uses emission and energy outputs from the GREET model, 
which allows only for selection of fixed generation mixes such as “national” or 
“California.”  If electrolysis is considered an important hydrogen production mechanism, 
capturing its impacts may require a more sophisticated approach to identifying its 
electricity sources than used by MARKAL and HyTrans.  Further, depending on the 
share of electrolytic hydrogen in the unfolding hydrogen economy and how long (and to 
what penetration into the transport sector) the model is meant to track hydrogen 
development, the investment model may be required to account for powerplant 
construction. 
 
 
                                                 
* A new version of the MARKAL source code has been developed, and is currently undergoing testing, that 
allows the user to specify as many seasons and time slices as necessary. 
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6.10 Investment Model 
All three transition models develop scenarios of a hydrogen transition according to rules 
dictated by an objective function coupled with constraints (e.g. on technology growth or 
pollutant emissions).  HyTrans and MARKAL search for an optimal solution, generally a 
least cost solution, for the combined investments encompassing all hydrogen 
development, whereas NEMS-H2 searches for a least-cost solution only for hydrogen 
production and distribution, with the behavior of other actors (consumers, vehicle 
manufacturers) simulated by investment rules without formal optimization.  As noted, the 
level of disaggregation of investors varies markedly among the models, from 
MARKAL’s “one actor” model (treating the energy sector as a single actor*) to NEMS-
H2 disaggregating industry only into fuel production entity and a vehicle manufacturing 
entity, to HyTrans disaggregating both segments down to the individual plant level 
(though with identical behavioral characteristics for each plant). 
 
Without judging the validity of each model’s representation of investment behavior, the 
investment models and different levels of disaggregation do raise some important issues 
about the models’ capability to evaluate a wide range of policies.  For example, only 
HyTrans would appear capable of evaluating tax credits, subsidies, or other inducements 
applied to a limited portion of potential investors, although NEMS-H2 could evaluate 
broad subsidies or credits aimed at all fuel suppliers or all vehicle manufacturers.  This is 
a particular concern because narrowly-targeted incentives may be valuable tool for 
stimulating a transition to hydrogen.  For example, very small hydrogen production 
appliances might be needed early in a rollout of hydrogen, but might have a limited 
lifetime depending on how quickly overall hydrogen production and fuel cell vehicle 
sales ramped up (because hydrogen costs from such appliances might be considerably 
higher than those from larger-scale production facilities).  Governments might want to 
focus higher incentives on such appliances because of this added risk.  Models without 
disaggregation into individual plants (or groups of plants) at different production scales 
could not evaluate the effects of such policies. 
 
6.11 Modeling Investor Decisionmaking Under Uncertainty 
As discussed previously (section 4.5), most complex models – including the three 
examined here – attempt to evaluate investor behavior under assumptions of perfect 
foresight of future condtions such as oil prices, or in some cases with alternative 
assumptions (such as “myopic” foresight) that still assume that investors are behaving as 
if they “know the future.”  Presumably, uncertainty about the future can be expressed, in 
part, by demanding higher-than-normal rates of projected profits for potential 
investments in order to leave some room for disappointments in future market conditions.  
Further, running the model multiple times with parametric changes in projected 
conditions can demonstrate how projected investment behavior would change under 
changing (projected) market conditions.   
 
What appears to be missing here, though, is a clear sense of whether running the models 
this way will likely capture the behavior of investors who know they face substantial 
                                                 
* This applies to the DOE and EPA versions of MARKAL.  The version used by the Northeast States for 
Coordinated Air Use management (NESCAUM) represents electric utilities in considerable detail. 
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uncertainty in future market conditions and who may behave in ways that hedge their 
risks.  Attempting to formulate an approach to dealing with this issue is well beyond the 
scope of this report….but we urge the model developers to focus explicitly on the 
issue of appropriately modeling investor behavior given large actual and perceived 
uncertainties in future market conditions. 
 
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The review of scenario analyses, most of which were based either on simple stock models 
or done without formal modeling, emphasizes the value of the complex transition models 
currently being developed.  These models force explicit decisions about a range of 
assumptions underlying the scenarios developed and ease the task of parametric analysis, 
which is crucial given the uncertainty associated with so many of the underlying 
assumptions. 
 
The complexity of the models does place a responsibility on the model developers to 
carefully explain their model’s strengths and weaknesses and to help users of the model 
or the model results understand the limitations of the results and how best to interpret 
them.  Unfortunately, models are likely to appear to users as “black boxes” to which 
questions are addressed and answers are produced without the means to understand the 
process that translated one into the other.  The modelers can automate some of this 
“explaining” process by designing model output to automatically include crucial input 
assumptions, but this is not enough.  Model developers might want to include a 
thoughtful “warning to users” sheet (or short pamphlet) that alerts potential users to the 
pitfalls they should avoid in using and interpreting model results.  However, it will be 
difficult to predict some of the problems that may occur in designing and interpreting 
runs, so modelers need to play an active role as advisers to users in designing and 
reviewing model runs, and they should make themselves available to serve as reviewers 
of interpretive discussions of results.  Model users, in turn, should recognize the value of 
involving the model developers in an ongoing advisory role at all stages of an analysis. 
 
There are strong differences among the three models examined here, and among these 
and other transition models currently under development.  It is inevitable that there will 
also be strong differences among the results obtained from these models even where the 
questions asked and basic input assumptions are the same.  Previous studies by the 
Energy Modeling Forum (at Stanford University) and others have proven very useful in 
providing comparative analyses of complex models, and it seems likely that duplicating 
such efforts with hydrogen transition models would prove equally useful. 
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Hydrogen Scenarios Literature Review:   
 
1. Full citation, including web site if applicable  U.S. DOE, Hydrogen Posture 
Plan: An Integrated Research, Development, and Demonstration Plan, February 
2004. 
2. Scenario description, if applicable 
a. Description of “vision,” if applicable: Need for strong Federal 
government role in near term, including government as early technology 
adopter; combination of central and decentralized production facilities, 
with pipelines and trucks/rail/barges distributing hydrogen; hydrogen 
economy, with use throughout the economy; some confusion about 
timeline for onsite production – time chart figure implies early production 
at existing central facilities with pipeline and truck/rail/barge delivery, 
followed by distributed onsite production at some later date…but text 
identifies distributed production “in the near-to-mid-term, …most 
hydrogen will likely be produced by technologies that do not require a 
new hydrogen delivery infrastructure.”  Milestones include technology to 
produce hydrogen from natural gas or liquid fuels at a refueling station 
that projects to a cost of $1.50/kg for hydrogen (at the pump, untaxed, no 
sequestration, at 5,000 psi). 
b. Dates and interval:  
c. Extent of focus on transition; possibly break out 2010-2030?  
d. Key variables projected, e.g. petroleum consumption, carbon 
equivalent, FCV penetration, hydrogen price H2 consumption, H2 
vehicles….but from simple stock model 
e. Methodology: “eyeballing,” stock model, historic analogy, etc.  
scenarios developed with simple stock model (“VISION”) 
• Does analysis/modeling include consideration of hydrogen’s 
competitors, e.g. biomass to liquids? no 
f. Scope: LDVs only, total transport, other sectors included all sectors; 
includes stationary co-production of hydrogen and electricity, combined 
heat and power systems 
g. Geographic scope: regional, national, international national 
h. Hydrogen production: feedstocks (biomass, wind electricity, etc), 
technologies range of technologies; importance of developing mass-
produced generators for fueling stations, with remote operations control 
i. Unique characteristics of the scenario development, e.g. risk 
analysis/scenario probability none 
3. Identification of key scenario drivers: technology advances; government 
policy measures (subsidy/incentives; CAFE regulation; government fleets; 
demo projects; broken out by H2 specific and general); changes in consumer 
attitudes; high fuel prices Strong Federal role, but not well defined….RD&D 
support plus technology adopter….but specific policies not stated 
(“government….(creates)…policies that stimulate the market”) 
4. Identification of key roadblocks  
5. Interesting results/conclusions  
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6. Comments on overall credibility (judgment by reviewer) no real discussion of 
roadblocks and how to overcome them; not especially convincing 
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Hydrogen Scenarios Literature Review:   
 
1. Full citation, including web site if applicable  Laitner, J.A., et al, “Adapting for 
Uncertainty: A Scenario Analysis of U.S. Technology Energy Futures,” Energy, 
Environment, and Economics in a New Era: Proceedings of the 24th Annual North 
American Conference of the USAEE/IAEE, Washington, DC, July 8-10, 2004. 
2. Scenario description, if applicable 
a. Description of “vision,” if applicable: Baseline to 2050 based on 
AEO2002, with three diverging scenarios and three added scenarios that 
inject a climate change emergency into the other three scenarios.  
• “Cheap Energy Reigns Supreme” reflects OPEC cooperation 
with U.S. interests, huge increases in U.S. domestic gas 
production (consumption to 70 Quads in 2050!), auto fuel 
economy unchanged. 
• “Big Problems Ahead” reflects OPEC in conflict with U.S., 
terrorism, instability, intermittent cutoffs and price shocks, no 
coherent energy policy, low R&D….only saving grace is 2/3 of 
vehicle sales are fuel cell vehicles by 2050 
• “Technology Drives the Market” reflects State governments 
establishing an integrated set of policies that drive energy 
efficiency, renewable energy, distributed generation, 
environmental improvement. Big improvements in fuel 
economy, fuel cell and electric vehicles, biomass energy, etc. 
• Three “strategic challenge and response” scenarios that introduce 
the risk of abrupt climate change, with a portfolio of strong 
energy policies in each of the first three scenarios, basically 
similar though somewhat different in intensity.  
b. Dates and interval: current to 2050 
c. Extent of focus on transition; possibly break out 2010-2030? Focused 
on long-term, not on transition 
d. Key variables projected, e.g. petroleum consumption, carbon 
equivalent, FCV penetration, hydrogen price GDP, energy demand, oil 
and natural gas imports, carbon emissions, LDV travel 
e. Methodology: “eyeballing,” stock model, historic analogy, etc.  
Scenario development and use of computable general equilibrium model, 
AMIGA 
• Does analysis/modeling include consideration of hydrogen’s 
competitors, e.g. biomass to liquids? Not clear 
f. Scope: LDVs only, total transport, other sectors included  
g. Geographic scope: regional, national, international Focus on U.S., but 
AMIGA includes 22 world regions 
h. Hydrogen production: feedstocks (biomass, wind electricity, etc), 
technologies wide range of technologies and feedstocks 
i. Unique characteristics of the scenario development, e.g. risk 
analysis/scenario probability One of the scenarios (Big Problems Ahead) 
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is essentially chaotic, with severe disruptions – unusual for scenario 
modeling studies 
3. Identification of key scenario drivers: technology advances; government 
policy measures (subsidy/incentives; CAFE regulation; government fleets; 
demo projects; broken out by H2 specific and general); changes in consumer 
attitudes; high fuel prices Scenarios explore a full range of drivers 
4. Identification of key roadblocks In some scenarios, low oil prices; lack of 
government incentives – no explicit consideration of hydrogen technological 
roadblocks that I can discern, but this is a general study, not explicitly focused on 
hydrogen 
5. Interesting results/conclusions  
a. Smart investment path emphasizing efficiency, advanced technologies can 
yield high economic growth even with high energy prices 
b. Today’s policy choices will affect the cost of responding to unexpected 
future surprises or outcomes 
c. Policies to encourage capital stock turnover and accelerate 
commercialization of high-efficiency, low-emission technologies can 
significantly reduce growth in U.S. primary energy demand and CO2 
emissions. (presumably there are built-in assumptions about the success of 
these policies) 
6. Comments on overall credibility (judgment by reviewer)  
Key uncertainty here is the degree of robustness of the modeling effort.  It isn’t clear to 
what extent the results are driven by robust modeling or, instead, by assumptions/guesses 
about the results of policies, effects of increased R&D.  Also, I have severe doubts about 
resources – the domestic natural gas resources implied by “Cheap Energy” are 
inconceivable to me.  
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Hydrogen Scenarios Literature Review: Southworth, F., Pillai, R.S., and Greene, D.L., 
“A Hydrogen Transition Planning Model: Creating a Framework for H2 Investment 
Analysis and Decision-Making,” Oak Ridge National Laboratory, January 21, 2004. 
 
This paper discusses the requirements for a hydrogen transition planning model, based on 
a literature review that includes many of the papers reviewed for this study.  It’s too 
dense to easily summarize, but it lays out an extremely ambitious agenda for a transition 
model incorporating multiple feedback loops through the infrastructure investment, 
vehicle choice, vehicle sales, manufacturer decisions about make and model diversity, 
hydrogen price, and so forth.  The paper implies, through a diagram of a prototype model, 
that the model might deal only with the LDV sector, with links to other models such as 
MARKAL so that it can “know” what’s going on in the rest of the economy and react to 
that.  On the other hand, the paper makes it clear that hydrogen use in the stationary 
market is a crucial component of any transition scenario, with the implication that it 
needs to be considered by the model directly.  In its list of questions, it makes it clear that 
global interactions are crucial questions that must be modeled, presumably by ties to 
global models. 
 
A few interesting points: 
The paper notes that a transition model should be able to support public policy 
formulation and decision-making on such policies as: 
RD&D support 
Legislation to advance hydrogen production and delivery systems 
Design of codes and standard 
Education of corporate and public opinion 
Some of these policies, e.g. RD&D support and education, are likely to be 
difficult to credibly model quantitatively. 
The paper lists some questions that the model should be able to address, and some of 
these have important implications for the structure of the model: 
In what scenarios (under what technological and institutional conditions) will 
the hydrogen economy succeed?  The model could answer this in two 
ways: it could either start with initial conditions and then “grow” the fuel 
supply sector, with hydrogen either entering the system or not; or it could 
instead be a simpler model that started with a hydrogen scenario input to 
the model, calculated a “best case” for it using optimization, and then 
calculated costs and benefits, with the modeler deciding whether the 
outcome was satisfactory (e.g., benefits exceeding costs, net cash flow 
becoming positive within a set number of years, etc).  The paper implies 
that the model should be able to do both (The model should be able to 
evaluate “both model simulated pathways and those pathways that are 
successful in the marketplace,” e.g. the latter will be input “after the 
fact.”). 
What are the costs and benefits (including global macroeconomic effects) of a 
hydrogen economy?  This implies some sort of linkage to a global 
economic model; this could be a one-way linkage, e.g. outputs of 
transition model fed to global model, or something more complicated and 
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interactive.  However, some of the model requirements clearly imply the 
need for interactive connections, for example, “learning” effects may well 
be relevant at the global level (given the global nature of the automobile 
industry). 
Which end-use markets are currently best suited to a transition to hydrogen?  
Although this obviously is a crucial question, do we really expect the 
transition model to answer this question?  The model prototype diagram 
later in the paper includes only the vehicle market, but this question 
implies that the model addresses all demand sectors. 
The paper suggests that the market demand model capture both consumer and 
automobile manufacturer responses to H2 vehicle technology.  This is fully in 
line with the Ricardo analysis, which focuses on manufacturer behavior and 
clearly considers this behavior as crucial to the success of any hydrogen scenario.  
The paper notes that some pathways offer benefits in the short-term while others may 
be more expensive in the short term but offer lower cost long-term solutions.  
This might not be a problem for a model that simply evaluates input development 
scenarios, but these tradeoffs will have to be carefully dealt with in a model that 
chooses a solution based on external conditions such as oil prices, policies, etc. 
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Hydrogen Scenarios Literature Review:   
 
1. Full citation, including web site if applicable  Lipman, T., et al, An Integrated 
Hydrogen Vision for California, White Paper/Guidance Document, July 9, 2004. 
2. Scenario description, if applicable 
a. Description of “vision,” if applicable: State-driven hydrogen program, 
begun with experimentation with stationary and vehicle applications, 
followed by fleet and facility-based vehicles with local refueling, then 
hydrogen corridors.  Early production basis is natural gas reforming.  Key 
part of vision: don’t try to “shoehorn” hydrogen into inappropriate roles, 
systems that aren’t ready – identify key niches and roles for hydrogen that 
improve the potential performance and economics of these systems. 
b. Dates and interval: initial stage through 2008 or later, includes initial 
hydrogen corridors (up to 1,000 vehicles, 50-60 refueling stations); growth 
stage 2008-2011+ includes expansion in stationary applications, refueling 
infrastructure spreads beyond key corridors into broader networks across 
more of the State (up to 20,000 vehicles, 100+ refueling stations); 
maturation stage post 2012, triggering of refueling requirements in major 
outlets, hydrogen becomes available at 10-20% of refueling outlets. 
c. Extent of focus on transition; possibly break out 2010-2030? Focus is 
primarily on transition, current – 2017 or so 
d. Key variables projected, e.g. petroleum consumption, carbon 
equivalent, FCV penetration, hydrogen price Not a quantitative 
analysis, no specific scenario development  
e. Methodology: “eyeballing,” stock model, historic analogy, etc.  not 
described 
• Does analysis/modeling include consideration of hydrogen’s 
competitors, e.g. biomass to liquids? no 
f. Scope: LDVs only, total transport, other sectors included transport 
plus stationary 
g. Geographic scope: regional, national, international California plus 
neighboring states 
h. Hydrogen production: feedstocks (biomass, wind electricity, etc), 
technologies Begins with natural gas, then renewables 
i. Unique characteristics of the scenario development, e.g. risk 
analysis/scenario probability 
3. Identification of key scenario drivers: technology advances; government 
policy measures (subsidy/incentives; CAFE regulation; government fleets; 
demo projects; broken out by H2 specific and general); changes in consumer 
attitudes; high fuel prices public/private partnerships, State ZEV mandates, 
State fleet purchases, subsidies for refueling stations, strong government focus on 
codes and standards 
4. Identification of key roadblocks cites National Research Council report; 
concern about potential for stranded assets 
5. Interesting results/conclusions  
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6. Comments on overall credibility (judgment by reviewer) This is purely a 
vision statement without analysis, so it’s hard to judge its credibility.  It does 
seem optimistic, with a very short timeline for building multiple stations despite 
its professed concern about stranded assets and the remaining concerns about 
extremely high vehicle prices, likely high fuel price, and other roadblocks. 
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Hydrogen Scenarios Literature Review:   
 
1. Full citation, including web site if applicable   
• Ogden, J. and Kaijuka, E., “New Methods for Modeling Regional Hydrogen 
Infrastructure Development,” presentation to National Hydrogen Association 
Meeting, Washington, DC, March 5, 2003 
• Ogden, J., Research at UCDavis on Design and Analysis of Hydrogen 
Distribution Infrastructure, presented to Fuel Pathways Technical Team, Oct 
14, 2004 
• Yang, C., “Integrated Infrastructure Transition Modeling for a Hydrogen 
Economy,” Hydrogen Systems Modeling Workshop, Sept 20, 2004 
2. Scenario description, if applicable 
a. Description of “vision,” if applicable: Given rate of hydrogen 
penetration in a city, find the least-cost transition path, define what the 
infrastructure looks like to satisfy some minimum requirements, define 
when a transition from distributed to central production should take place.  
The described modeling appears to start with a scenario of hydrogen 
penetration and compute what that would look like, rather than how 
outside conditions will affect whether and how fast hydrogen market 
growth would occur.  In other words, this is normative modeling. 
b. Dates and interval: 2010-2070+, appears to be calculated in yearly 
intervals 
c. Extent of focus on transition; possibly break out 2010-2030? Primary 
focus on transition, crossover from distributed to central H2 production 
d. Key variables projected, e.g. petroleum consumption, carbon 
equivalent, FCV penetration, hydrogen price: Optimal system design 
(e.g., pipeline routes for specific case studies, # of refueling stations, etc), 
cash flow (given H2 price), resource use (e.g. coal use, natural gas use, 
electricity use), delivered H2 cost, CO2 emissions and avoided emissions, 
investment cost 
e. Methodology: “eyeballing,” stock model, historic analogy, etc.  
Extensive transition modeling/analysis, including: 
1. Infrastructure costs calculated as function of  city 
geographic factors, H2 market size, etc.; modeling 
methodology not clear from presentations, clarity awaits 
publication of papers, but claim of system optimization for 
least cost 
2. Geographic Information System analysis of station siting 
• Does analysis/modeling include consideration of hydrogen’s 
competitors, e.g. biomass to liquids? No 
f. Scope: LDVs only, total transport, other sectors included Highway 
vehicles 
g. Geographic scope: regional, national, international City 
h. Hydrogen production: feedstocks (biomass, wind electricity, etc), 
technologies: Natural gas, coal, biomass, wind, solar; production 
technologies are natural gas steam reforming and electrolysis for central 
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and distributed, other central technologies are coal gasification with and 
without sequestration, biomass gasification, H2/electricity co-production   
i. Unique characteristics of the scenario development, e.g. risk 
analysis/scenario probability 
3. Identification of key scenario drivers: technology advances; government 
policy measures (subsidy/incentives; CAFE regulation; government fleets; 
demo projects; broken out by H2 specific and general); changes in consumer 
attitudes; high fuel prices Presentations discuss future analysis of the impact of 
policy, feedstock prices, technology changes.  Current analysis assumes 
hydrogen penetration and searches for the best means to achieve it, rather than 
examining how conditions will affect hydrogen market entry and growth…if this 
approach continues, analysis of key drivers will affect the computed approach 
and costs 
4. Identification of key roadblocks not discussed 
5. Interesting results/conclusions Analysis of specific case study cities, States, e.g. 
Ohio; in Ohio, repowering of existing coal-fired powerplants with gasification 
could yield satisfaction of electricity demand plus H2 for 2.5 million fuel cell 
vehicles (29% of LDV fleet); other results: 
a. It can make sense to start with distributed production, then switch to 
central plant production 
b. Rapid growth of H2 demand lowers transition costs, CO2 emissions over 
time 
6. Comments on overall credibility (judgment by reviewer) Presentations give 
the strong impression of a detailed and thoughtful effort….but not enough detail 
to judge further. 
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Hydrogen Scenarios Literature Review: Ogden, J., “Hydrogen Systems 
Modeling: a) Transition Modeling: Early Results; b) Observations and Research 
Questions; c) Thoughts on the State of the Art,” presented at the Hydrogen 
Pathways; Hydrogen Systems Modeling Workshop, UCDavis, Sept 20-12, 
2004. 
 
Description only of topics relevant to transition modeling: 
 
1. Consensus/debate among modelers: 
a. Hydrogen transitions will take decades 
b. Transitions will be costly, but same order of magnitude of 
projected oil and gas infrastructure investments (my comment: 
only if reference case applies to oil and gas – strong efficiency 
efforts could substantially decrease oil and gas infrastructure 
requirements….gets to the question about what the correct 
comparison scenario is) 
c. Substantial time before anybody profits, though time and 
investment costs extremely variable – implies need for 
understanding decision rules of various investors, and having a 
model that can track each investor/actor 
d. Large geographic variations 
e. Interaction with rest of energy system is important (so need some 
link to stationary hydrogen uses, energy prices in the economy 
and the effect of hydrogen use on these prices, possibly world 
energy market) 
2. Multiple model types for transition: engineering/economic system 
design, lifecycle assessment, planning/urban design, equilibrium energy 
system model, system dynamics, agent-based models, integrated 
assessment 
3. Modeling hydrogen demand is difficult 
4. Key modeling questions: 
a. Boundary drawing (same issue as how to deal with interaction 
with rest of energy system) 
b. Demand for hydrogen 
c. Consumer behavior, behavior of other agents 
d. Market dynamics 
e. Level of complexity needed (tradeoff between being able to 
model a complex system and problems of our actual 
understanding of all the interactions, analytic costs – including 
need to deal with a large volume of input data) 
5. Summary of various presentations: 
a. Christopher Yang  
i. Demand profile is critical determinant of hydrogen cost 
and optimal transition year 
ii. City size another important determinant 
b. David Hart (Imperial College, London 
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i. Larger plants require fast demand ramp-up (to help pay 
capital costs), difficult with high cost vehicles 
ii. Delivery fleets have short lives, favor low capital cost 
vehicle (Is this about current rapid turnover of such 
vehicles or harsh operating environment?  Could fleets 
adjust their business practices to deal with high capital 
cost vehicles?) 
iii. Lack of resale market can be a major problem (same 
issues as above ii) 
iv. Planning issues and land availability will affect 
infrastructure development in cities (presumably this is 
about the idea that large dense cities can support central 
plants from a demand density standpoint, but can the 
pipelines be laid and service stations built in developed 
cities?) 
v. Infrastructure type depends on demand ramp-up rate 
(same as i?) 
c. Stephan Unnasch, TIAX 
i. Early transition costs can be low (mobile fuelers), but 
eventually infrastructure investment gets risky with 
potential for stranded assets 
d. Sandy Thomas, H2Gen 
i. Renewable hydrogen from ethanol is least costly 
renewable option 
ii. Need to identify consumer valuation of hydrogen FCV 
e. David Greene, et al, HyTrans 
f. Conzelmann, ANL 
i. Agent-based complex adaptive systems approach 
ii. Models heterogeneity of market participants (which deals 
with the issue of capturing the different requirements of 
the various actors) 
iii. Focuses on transition, designed to gain understanding of 
causes and drivers 
iv. Market-specific criteria for different energy markets (for 
example, appropriate discount rate for vehicle 
manufacturer may be different from that of fuel provider) 
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Hydrogen Scenarios Literature Review:   
 
1. Full citation, including web site if applicable  Eyre, N., Fergusson, M., and Mills, 
R., Fuelling Road Transport: Implications for Energy Policy, Energy Saving 
Trust/Institute for European Environmental Policy/National Society for Clean Air and 
Environmental Protection, November 2002. 
2. Scenario description, if applicable 
a. Description of “vision,” if applicable: The scenarios are combinations of 
three types of scenarios – transport demand, vehicle technology, and 
energy scenarios: 
• Transport demand 
1. Baseline – business as usual, with traffic growth trailing off 
in mid-term to reflect capacity constraints and saturation.  
Heavy goods traffic grows strongly. 
2. World markets – globalized future with fast growth and 
growing mobility 
3. Global sustainability – societal action to curb adverse 
effects, with lower traffic growth, mode shifts 
4. Central case – composite vision with some slowdown in car 
use over baseline, but otherwise similar. 
• Vehicle technology 
1. Limited progress, only modest technical change except 
dieselization 
2. Moderate progress 
3. Rapid progress -- with early introduction of hybrids and 
then fuel cells for cars, buses 
4. Biomass alternative -- with a rapid switch to methanol, not 
to hydrogen fuel cells; 50% of new cars on direct methanol 
fuel cells by 2050. 
5. Combined H2/methanol, with hydrogen in passenger 
vehicles and methanol in goods vehicles. 
• Energy 
1. Business as usual – lots of oil and gas use, with hydrogen 
only from gas; coal and nuclear electricity eventually 
phased out; 20% renewable electricity by 2050. 
2. High renewables – mostly about renewable electricity, with 
nearly 100% by 2050; mostly gas for hydrogen production, 
moderate alcohol additives to highway fuels 
3. Electrolytic hydrogen – hydrogen from electricity 
exclusively, after 2020; high renewable electricity, 
magnitude as in “High Renewables.” 
4. High biofuels – woody biomass for methanol and ethanol 
by 2020; limited hydrogen from woody biomass; natural 
gas is primary electricity feedstock. 
b. Dates and interval: 2000-2050, with focus on 2010, 2020, and 2050 
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c. Extent of focus on transition; possibly break out 2010-2030? Results 
do have a separate focus on early transition period, but there is no 
discussion of transition issues.  No discussion of any analysis of the 
realism of the transition, e.g. evaluation of cash flow. 
d. Key variables projected, e.g. petroleum consumption, carbon 
equivalent, FCV penetration, hydrogen price Primary energy use, Final 
user energy, carbon emissions 
e. Methodology: “eyeballing,” stock model, historic analogy, etc.  
Scenarios are constructed based on previous studies, with major variables 
(car and other mode use, % penetration of vehicle technologies over time 
into new vehicle fleet, % useage of biofuel additives, % feedstock sources 
for hydrogen production) all exogeneously specified; stock model and 
well-to-wheels calculations derive energy and carbon emissions results.  
Does analysis/modeling include consideration of hydrogen’s 
competitors, e.g. biomass to liquids 
f. Scope: LDVs only, total transport, other sectors included Focus on 
transport   
g. Geographic scope: regional, national, international United Kingdom 
h. Hydrogen production: feedstocks (biomass, wind electricity, etc), 
technologies Full range of feedstocks 
i. Unique characteristics of the scenario development, e.g. risk 
analysis/scenario probability No 
3. Identification of key scenario drivers: technology advances; government policy 
measures (subsidy/incentives; CAFE regulation; government fleets; demo 
projects; broken out by H2 specific and general); changes in consumer attitudes; 
high fuel prices Since all major variables are exogeneously supplied, there are no 
analytic drivers.  The scenarios do postulate a wide range of drivers – public attitudes 
towards environment; globalization; government policy; technological progress – but, 
again, all key variables are simply specified rather than derived from “initial 
conditions.” 
4. Identification of key roadblocks No discussion of roadblocks 
5. Interesting results/conclusions  
a. It makes sense to move forward with natural gas as a hydrogen source, 
because “any hydrogen production could be designed to draw on a range 
of different fuels quite quickly in the event of external disruption to gas 
supplies.”  Perhaps true only if the hydrogen were produced in central 
facilities, which could be adapted to other feedstocks.  With gas station 
hydrogen production, which might be the most logical early system 
structure, adaptation to other feedstocks seems unlikely. 
b. Of the two key areas of energy insecurity – concentration of power in the 
hands of a few oil exporters, and potential for short term disruptions – 
none of the examined scenarios, which cover a wide range of possibilities, 
offers much insurance against a disruption in the short term beyond the 
possibilities of bi-fuel vehicles.  In the longer term, hydrogen use with 
multiple feedstocks does guard against such a disruption. 
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c. There are no carbon benefits in producing hydrogen for use in 
transport from renewable electricity.  This is because, for the United 
Kingdom’s electric system, using the renewable electricity to instead 
substitute for natural gas-based electricity (which would be the marginal 
electricity producer) would save ~ 100 grams of carbon/kWh vs. 60 
gC/kWh to displace diesel fuel in a diesel hybrid.  Note here that it is 
crucial to compare transport hydrogen use to competing uses for the 
feedstock; also, the baseline vehicle technology is crucial to the 
calculation.  Using diesel hybrids as the baseline appears to make perfect 
sense for the UK, because diesel is strong and because a world where 
hydrogen fuel cell vehicles make sense is also a world where hybrids 
make sense.  Note that the renewable electricity being talked about here is 
windpower, solar, or hydro, not biomass-generated electricity (because 
biomass use as a feedstock for hydrogen production would make most 
sense as a gasifier feedstock, not a feedstock for electricity to electrolysis 
production of hydrogen).  Were low carbon electricity sources the actual 
marginal sources, this conclusion would change.  Such sources include 
renewable electricity, nuclear, fossil with sequestration, and natural gas 
electricity generation at efficiencies above 80%, meaning combined heat 
and power (CHP). 
d. The conclusion about renewable electricity producing hydrogen as not 
being the best use would change if the transport use of hydrogen gives rise 
to additional demand for investment in renewables, so that new grid 
connected renewable electricity sources are developed and utilized 
specifically as a result of an additional market in transport.  The 
implication here is that fuel cycle evaluation of hydrogen and competing 
technologies would benefit from a careful examination of the context and 
any secondary effects of implementing the technologies. 
e. For long distance shipping of energy, hydrogen competes well with 
electricity and the economies of scale of hydrogen transportation are likely 
to be better – in other words, if one has the choice of generating renewable 
electricity at a remote location and either shipping the electricity to 
electrolyzers at the market location or shipping the hydrogen after 
producing it at the generation site, shipping the hydrogen is a good 
alternative. 
f. A viable option for using biomass as a fuel cell energy feedstock is to first 
produce bioalcohols and distribute these to stations for reforming into 
hydrogen, or directly to vehicles for onboard reforming or (with methanol) 
for direct use in a fuel cell.  A particular benefit of producing bialcohols is 
that “they offer a clear and technically feasible alternative path to a 
renewable transport fuel system even if hydrogen fuel cells prove not to be 
viable.” 
g. For the UK, woody fuels might supply 50% of current transport fuels 
demand using lands with poorer quality than required for food crops.  In 
contrast, annual biofuel crops would require far more land, and that land 
would have to be of higher quality.  
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h. No doubt that hydrogen from biomass will be cheaper than hydrogen from 
electricity. 
i. Using woody biomass to manufacture hydrogen (or alcohol) for use in an 
efficient fuel cell vehicle has comparable carbon benefits to using biomass 
for CHP, and probably larger benefits than using biomass for either heat or 
power generation alone. 
j. Developing a hydrogen infrastructure will be exceedingly costly if it is 
done rapidly, replacing assets before the end of their natural lifetimes.  
Hydrogen from natural gas therefore seems likely to provide “a step on the 
route to a slower and more economically acceptable transition to hydrogen 
vehicles.” 
6. Comments on overall credibility (judgment by reviewer) This study seems 
carefully done with multiple scenarios.  One concern is that many comparisons are 
generated in areas where technical uncertainty is quite high, but definitive answers 
are given without parametric examination of the uncertain variables.  Also, it must be 
remembered that the key variables are generated by assumption rather than analysis, 
that is, things like fuel cell vehicle penetration rates, yet there is no apparent attempt 
to subject the scenarios to reality tests such as examinations of cash flows. 
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Hydrogen Scenarios Literature Review of The Hydrogen Economy: Opportunities, 
Costs, Barriers, and R&D Needs, National Academy of Engineering, Board on 
Energy & Environmental Systems, 2004. (Presentation by M. Ravage, February 4, 
2004), plus some reading of the full report. 
 
Vision: The very early transitional program will probably be fueled by pressurized 
or liquefied hydrogen being trucked from existing, centralized facilities.  Then, 
distributed systems will take hold, primarily natural gas reformers to supply 
hydrogen; urges DOE to focus research on small appliances, including electrolysis 
(these need breakthroughs).  Some possibilities for early use of renewables in 
distributed production, especially wind-powered electrolysis – could play a key role 
in transition.  Foresees large penetration of ICE hybrids (60% penetration of new 
vehicle fleet by 2024), then superceded by hydrogen FCVs. 
 
Key transition conclusion: “There will likely be a lengthy transition period during 
which fuel cell vehicles and hydrogen are not competitive with internal combustion 
engine vehicles.”  Obvious implication is that either government or private industry, or 
both, will have to subsidize hydrogen development for a number of years for such 
development to succeed.  The further implication is that a model must be capable of 
adequately modeling the impacts of various types of subsidy programs, since these 
will have to be an integral part of any hydrogen transition. 
 
Stress high risk of failure; during past 20 years, most alternative fuel programs have 
failed. 
 
Natural gas reforming of questionable applicability to long term, given supply from 
imports  
 
Judges delivery and vehicle storage problems as “formidable” – pipeline delivery 
difficult because of embrittlement, propensity to leak; onboard storage difficult 
because of energy, space, cost, and weight problems with both compressed and 
liquid hydrogen.  
 
Believes pressurized or liquid onboard storage can’t meet DOE energy density 
target, suspects safety of high pressure storage may be an important issue; focus on 
alternative storage systems (what about “superefficient ultralightweight vehicle?). 
 
For transition: 
• Niche markets are crucial 
• Government as first customer? 
• Safety must be removed as an issue 
• Key question: What incentives will entrepreneurs and investors need before 
they will commit capital? 
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Hydrogen Scenarios Literature Review:   
 
1. Full citation, including web site if applicable  Lovins, A.B. and Williams, 
B.D., “A Strategy for the Hydrogen Transition,” 10th Annual U.S. Hydrogen 
Meeting, National Hydrogen Association, Vienna, Virginia, April 7-9, 1999. 
2. Scenario description, if applicable 
a. Description of “vision,” if applicable 
• Fuel cells first move into buildings, especially those where new 
electric infrastructure would otherwise be needed, using 
hydrogen from mass-produced appliances (electrolyzers or 
natural gas steam reformers).  The hot water produced by fuel 
cells can be used for heating, cooling, and dehumidification.  
Customers benefit from enhanced reliability and excellent power 
quality. 
Production volume from use in buildings reduces costs, improves 
performance for introduction into extremely efficient vehicles, 
focusing especially on vehicles whose owners work or live in or 
near the buildings.  Ultra-high efficiency (carbon-fiber bodies, 
etc) solves on-board storage problem, since less fuel is needed, 
and allows small fuel cells to be used, reducing costs further.  
Additional benefits gained from using vehicles as a generating 
asset, sending electricity back to the grid during peak periods. 
Growing market yields incentives for free-standing fuel stations and 
bulk supply options 
b. Dates and interval: near-term, e.g. next 10-20 years 
c. Extent of focus on transition; possibly break out 2010-2030?: almost 
exclusively on the transition 
d. Key variables projected, e.g. petroleum consumption, carbon 
equivalent, FCV penetration, hydrogen price Virtually no 
quantification of these variables.  Paper seems to treat likely hydrogen  
price as competing with gasoline on an energy-services-delivered basis, 
e.g. high because hydrogen system is postulated to produce extremely high 
efficiencies (yielding large incentives for hydrogen producers) 
e. Methodology: “eyeballing,” stock model, historic analogy, etc. 
Basically a “vision” argument supplemented by multiple 
estimates/calculations of efficiencies, costs, etc. of hydrogen and gasoline 
systems.  No models used/no formal analysis. 
• Does analysis/modeling include consideration of hydrogen’s 
competitors, e.g. biomass to liquids? Some consideration of 
EVs, methanol, CNG vehicles 
f. Scope: LDVs only, total transport, other sectors included LDVs, some 
trucks and buses, buildings 
g. Geographic scope: regional, national, international Focus is really at 
the local level, with some discussion of regional differences 
h. Hydrogen production: feedstocks (biomass, wind electricity, etc), 
technologies Focus on distributed electrolyzers and natural gas steam 
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reformers; some discussion of larger scale technologies, e.g. hydro and 
wind with hydrogen storage, natural gas wellhead reforming with 
sequestration 
i. Unique characteristics of the scenario development, e.g. risk 
analysis/scenario probability None 
3. Identification of key scenario drivers: technology advances; government 
policy measures (subsidy/incentives; CAFE regulation; government fleets; 
demo projects; broken out by H2 specific and general); changes in consumer 
attitudes; high fuel prices Key driver is the development of ultra-efficient 
vehicles, which greatly reduce some of the concerns about hydrogen vehicles 
(esp. fuel storage, system cost), and pursuit of the scenario vision; the paper 
basically concludes that technology breakthroughs and strong government 
programs aren’t necessary, that technology improvements required are those that 
will come naturally with growing production.  However, carbon credits would 
certainly be useful. 
4. Identification of key roadblocks None except perhaps lack of vision. 
5. Interesting results/conclusions   
• No real technology breakthroughs are needed for a successful 
hydrogen economy 
• Integrating hydrogen use in buildings and vehicles yields 
substantial benefits, cost reductions 
6. Comments on overall credibility (judgment by reviewer) 
The scenario/vision of this paper is both brilliant and extremely problematic, 
primarily because of the details (see J. Wilson’s paper).  Some problems: 
• Quantification of hydrogen’s competitiveness in vehicles 
compares ultra-efficient hydrogen vehicles with gasoline in 
conventional vehicles, ignoring the obvious fact that 
development of the former will create far more efficient gasoline 
vehicles, for example greatly reducing the cost of hydridization 
• Many of the hydrogen efficiency calculations in the paper appear 
extremely optimistic, probably leave out important sources of 
energy losses such as accessory and parasitic losses in fuel cell 
vehicles, AC/DC conversion, electric motor losses, etc.  On the 
other hand, efficiency values given for gasoline systems seem 
very low, especially for the newest vehicles and future vehicles. 
• Safety concerns are minimized, e.g. need for very careful 
maintenance and monitoring of thousands of small reformers. 
• Overconfidence about lack of need for technological 
breakthroughs, both in ultralight vehicles and in fuel cells 
(reliability and durability are major concerns). 
• The early vision of vehicles refueling at workplace/living place 
ignores need for refueling for out-of-area travel.  
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Hydrogen Scenarios Literature Review: Sperling, D. and Cannon, J.S., The 
Hydrogen Energy Transition: Moving Toward the Post Petroleum Age in 
Transportation, Elsevier Academic Press, 2004 
 
Chapter 12, “Lessons Learned from 15 Years of Alternative Fuels Experience – 
1988 to 2003,” McNutt, B. and Rodgers, D. 
 
1. Conventional vehicle/fuel industries will compete vigorously, so altfuel vehicles 
have to be significantly better and stay better as conventional vehicles improve 
2. Niche markets don’t necessarily grow into mainstream markets 
a. Fleet vehicles didn’t match needs of general consumers 
b. Tradeoffs acceptable to fleets, e.g. limited range, were unacceptable to 
general consumers 
c. Limited engineering resources available for emissions testing and 
certification, limited models available 
3. FLEETS 
a. Most light-duty fleets are no longer centrally fueled, less attractive altfuel 
targets 
b. Fleets want low operating costs, are very resistant to expensive fuels and 
especially to expensive vehicles 
c. Centrally fueled fleets often can buy conventional fuel in bulk, at lower 
prices 
d. Fleets tend to have longstanding relationships with vehicle and engine 
suppliers that are not easily dissolved 
e. Fleet vehicle turnover is high, so they need a robust resale market 
f. Labor costs for extra driving time to find a refueling station and extra 
refueling time can swamp any fuel cost savings 
4. Early builders of refueling stations have usually been disappointed 
5. Transition technologies can become so good as to overwhelm the end point 
technology 
a. FFVs over dedicated vehicles 
b. Reformulated gasoline over methanol 
c. HEVs over EVs 
6. The current vehicle/gasoline system has enormous economies of scale 
7. Federal fleet requirements are too small and too varied to provide significant 
economies of scale 
8. Conclusion: infrastructure development for hydrogen will require a strong and 
long-term government role 
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Chapter 14, “Understanding  the Transition to New Fuels and Vehicles: Lessons 
Learned from Analysis and Experience of Alternative Fuels and Hybrid Vehicles,” 
Leiby, P. and Rubin, J. 
 
1. Conclusions of existing models of altfuels penetration reflect exogeneous 
assumptions regarding fuel and vehicle prices or AFV penetration or both 
2. TAFV – determines fuel and vehicle prices and penetration rates from market 
conditions.  The model tries to satisfy final demand for transport services 
determined for AEO projection of LDV fuel use (my question: since each 
vehicle/fuel combination has different efficiencies, is the model trying to satisfy 
demand for fuel/Btus or demand for vmt?  Modeled barriers: 
a. Consumer cost of limited fuel infrastructure and retail availability 
b. Economies of scale 
c. Cost of limited model choice and diversity 
d. Technological improvement and cost reduction through learning by doing 
3. Transitional barriers, and the particular transition paths pursued, matter a lot for 
the technology’s ultimate market success.” 
4. There is a strong conflict between diversity of choice and cost savings from 
economies of scale in vehicle production and network economies for fuel 
provision…….so there’s a major tension between the merits of producing 
different AFV technologies for different circumstances and for different consumer 
regions or market segments, and the substantial scale and network economies 
associated with producing and fueling and fueling a single vehicle-fuel 
technology 
5. Niche introduction to fleets hasn’t worked in the past…but niche applications can 
be an effective strategy if one anticipates substantial technological learning by 
doing…..relevant to hydrogen. 
6. Note: “forgetting” can also occur, as well as learning; production experience can 
depreciate over time…..”Learning is very tricky to represent.” 
7. “Little rigorous analysis of alternative ways the transition to hydrogen could 
take place.” 
8. Important issues for modeling a hydrogen transition: interactions with other 
energy sectors and the spatial and geographic detail in the location of production, 
delivery, and demand. 
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Hydrogen Scenarios: Literature Review of: Tyndall Centre report 
 
1. Full citation, including web site if applicable: Dutton, G., et al, The Hydrogen 
Energy Economy: Its Long-Term Role in Greenhouse Gas Reduction, Tyndall 
Centre Technical Report 18, January 2005, United Kingdom 
2. Scenario description, if applicable 
a. Description of “vision,” if applicable:  
4 scenarios, with 2 variables (individuals/consumers vs. community, 
regionalization vs. globalization).  The scenarios are World Markets 
(integrated economies, focus on low energy prices); Provincial Enterprise 
(regional focus, low energy price focus); Global Sustainability (integrated, 
high environmental consciousness); Local Stewardship (regional focus, 
environmentally conscious) 
b. Dates, e.g. 2000-2050, and interval (5 year, 10 year, etc): 2000-2050; 
analysis is annual, but results given in 10 year increments 
c. Extent of focus on transition; possibly break out 2010-2030? Analytic 
concern about dates of technology introduction and rates of increase, but 
no formal analysis of transition 
d. Key variables projected, e.g. petroleum consumption, carbon 
equivalent, FCV penetration, hydrogen price  
CO2 emissions; total transport energy use; % H2 vehicles; H2 production 
capacity 
e. Methodology: “eyeballing,” stock model, historic analogy, etc. 
Overwhelmingly based on judgment, with some use of accounting models, 
e.g. vehicle stock model.  Scenario inputs based on judgment are 
economic and energy growth rates, energy intensity changes, H2 
technology penetration by sector, type and character of new electric 
capacity, type and character of H2 production.  Accounting models 
calculate electricity and fuel demands, power station stock, CO2. 
• Does analysis/modeling include consideration of hydrogen’s 
competitors, e.g. biomass to liquids? 
No, but authors recognize potential for competition 
f. Scope: LDVs only, total transport, other sectors included  All sectors, 
but real focus is on transport and electricity supply 
g. Geographic scope: regional, national, international United Kingdom, 
with ROW (rest of World) assumed to be subject to same forces 
h. Hydrogen production: feedstocks (biomass, wind electricity, etc), 
technologies  Basically all feedstocks and production technologies 
i. Unique characteristics of the scenario development, e.g. risk 
analysis/scenario probability  None 
3. Identification of key scenario drivers: technology advances; government 
policy measures (subsidy/incentives; CAFE regulation; government fleets; 
demo projects; broken out by H2 specific and general); changes in consumer 
attitudes; high fuel prices  Scenario assumptions are translated into judgments 
about key energy inputs; some drivers are discussed in scenario descriptions, but 
not a factor in analysis 
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4. Identification of key roadblocks  
Liquefaction energy ~ 35% of H2 energy, with R&D goal of 20% 
Electricity and biomass can be H2 competitors, e.g. EVs and biomass liquids 
5. Interesting results/conclusions 
a. In the World Markets scenario, electricity supply is dominated by natural 
gas and coal (because of low environmental consciousness), but low H2 
production and use 
b. A hydrogen economy is a high energy economy, because hydrogen 
production and distribution is energy intensive 
c. Implementation of a hydrogen economy has only a modest effect on 
natural gas supply, because high H2 is compatible only with a desire for 
low CO2 emissions, thus an emphasis on renewables and perhaps 
nuclear…BUT if H2 demand expands rapidly and renewable and nuclear 
capacity can’t keep up, gas-driven SMR might be pushed into service 
d. Analysis needs to account for the role of consumer behavior 
e. Also need to account for the role of oil price shocks 
6. Comments on overall credibility (judgment by reviewer) 
Completely based on expert judgment, without much quantitative analysis, except 
for “accounting” 
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Hydrogen Scenarios Literature Review:   
 
7. Full citation, including web site if applicable  Lasher, S., Unnasch, S., and 
Chan, M., “Hydrogen Infrastructure: Energy, Costs, and Transition,” 2004 Fuel 
Cell Seminar, San Antonio, TX, November 1-5, 2004, TIAX LLC; also, Unnasch, 
S., “Hydrogen Transition Model H2NowNPV,” Hydrogen Systems Modeling 
Workshop, UCDavis, September 20, 2004 (Powerpoint presentation); also, 
Lasher, S., “Fuel Choice for FCVs: Hydrogen Infrastructure Costs,” DOE Merit 
Review, May 25, 2005, powerpoint presentation. 
8. Scenario description, if applicable 
a. Description of “vision,” if applicable: Normative scenario, starting with 
assumption about vehicle penetration, analysis determines number of 
stations, production facilities, costs, and benefits.  Fast and Slow (30% by 
2050) Introduction Scenarios; President’s Initiative as a sensitivity case; 
high fuel economy case (both gasoline ICEVs and H2 FCVs) 
b. Dates and interval: 2003-2063 
c. Extent of focus on transition; possibly break out 2010-2030? Fast 
transition about 2007-2023, slow about 2007-2035 
d. Key variables projected, e.g. petroleum consumption, carbon 
equivalent, FCV penetration, hydrogen price GHG emissions; energy 
use; hydrogen price; # of fueling stations; cumulative investment in 
infrastructure; hydrogen revenue 
e. Methodology: “eyeballing,” stock model, historic analogy, etc.  
Examination of infrastructure cash flow is a particular focus, especially 
examining negative cash flow; key assumption is that H2 is priced at 
gasoline $/mile equivalent.  H2A capital and operating costs for long-term 
station costs.  2005 presentation includes GREET for GHG inputs. 
• Does analysis/modeling include consideration of hydrogen’s 
competitors, e.g. biomass to liquids? Apparently not 
f. Scope: LDVs only, total transport, other sectors included LDVs only 
g. Geographic scope: regional, national, international National; 
presentation mentions examination of  consecutive regional roll-in of 
FCVs, starting with West Coast 
h. Hydrogen production: feedstocks (biomass, wind electricity, etc), 
technologies Transition production is natural gas/steam reforming and 
decentralized electrolysis; variety of feedstocks for later; presentation 
focuses on natural gas/steam reforming, including mobile fuelers that can 
be moved from region to region as scenario develops (2005 presentation 
includes excess or “moth-balled” merchant, ammonia, refinery, and 
methanol plant hydrogen capacity). 
i. Unique characteristics of the scenario development, e.g. risk 
analysis/scenario probability 
9. Identification of key scenario drivers: technology advances; government 
policy measures (subsidy/incentives; CAFE regulation; government fleets; 
demo projects; broken out by H2 specific and general); changes in consumer 
attitudes; high fuel prices 
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10. Identification of key roadblocks  
11. Interesting results/conclusions For a slow transition, it takes 40 years and $50 
billion investment before a simple payback is achieved (in 2005 presentation, 
NPV goes positive by ~50 years); fast transition allows very little negative cash 
flow, breakeven by 2023 and rapid buildup of positive cash flow; “relatively 
modest investment is required to achieve a 10% fueling station coverage with 
cheap distributed infrastructure” (presentation).  Fast transition would require 
significant market drivers (but so would a slow one).  The major financial risks 
could be low in the short-term with mobile fuelers, but over the long-term, 
potential for stranded assets is high.  Use of existing hydrogen capacity for the 
transition is interesting, but will be hampered by high transportation and feedstock 
costs. 
Slow introduction of hydrogen vehicles will do little over the next 50 years; and 
fast introduction will take 25+ years to see a significant impact. 
Investment risks are high for all stakeholders! 
12. Comments on overall credibility (judgment by reviewer) Need further details 
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Hydrogen Scenarios Literature Review:   
 
1. Full citation, including web site if applicable  Millett, S. and Mahadevan, K., 
“Commercialization Scenarios of Polymer Electrolyte Membrane Fuel Cell 
Applications for Stationary Power Generation in the United States by the Year 
2015, Battelle Memorial Institute; and same authors, “PEM Fuel Cell Scenarios to 
2015, Powerpoint presentation, November 3, 2004. 
2. Scenario description, if applicable 5 scenarios: commercial disappointment; 
qualified success in residential and light commercial applications; roaring 
success; success with a hydrocarbon infrastructure; qualified success in 
commercial and office building applications. 
a. Description of “vision,” if applicable:  
b. Dates and interval: current to 2015 
c. Extent of focus on transition; possibly break out 2010-2030?  
d. Key variables projected, e.g. petroleum consumption, carbon 
equivalent, FCV penetration, hydrogen price fuel cell investment and 
sales, scenario probability 
e. Methodology: “eyeballing,” stock model, historic analogy, etc.  
Interactive Future Simulations model; scenario descriptors defined by 
expert judgment, each with alternative outcomes that are mutually 
exclusive and exhaustive, descriptor outcomes and cross-impact matrix 
defined by expert judgment. 
• Does analysis/modeling include consideration of hydrogen’s 
competitors, e.g. biomass to liquids? Conventional fossil 
alternatives 
f. Scope: LDVs only, total transport, other sectors included stationary 
fuel cell markets; automotive applications is a descriptor, with the extent 
of the automotive market affecting other determinants of stationary market 
development (but connection between stationary and automotive 
applications is not described)  
g. Geographic scope: regional, national, international national 
h. Hydrogen production: feedstocks (biomass, wind electricity, etc), 
technologies not clear 
i. Unique characteristics of the scenario development, e.g. risk 
analysis/scenario probability probability analysis 
3. Identification of key scenario drivers: technology advances; government 
policy measures (subsidy/incentives; CAFE regulation; government fleets; 
demo projects; broken out by H2 specific and general); changes in consumer 
attitudes; high fuel prices 28 descriptors/drivers  
a. Retail price of PEM fuel cell system 
b. Prevailing system architecture of PEM fuel cell 
c. Retail cost of PEM fuel cell reformer 
d. PEM fuel cell system ease of installation 
e. Consumer market image of PEM fuel cells 
f. Magnitude of PEM fuel cell investments in the US 
g. Nature of PEM fuel cell manufacturing 
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h. PEM fuel cell technical advances 
i. Hydrogen fuel sources 
j. Fossil fuel and engine/turbine technical advances 
k. Advances in electric storage technologies 
l. Stringency of environmental regulations 
m. Adequacy of codes and standards for PEM fuel cells 
n. Degree of public policy support for fuel cells 
o. Strength of national energy policies 
p. Electric grid reliability and quality 
q. Role of distributed generation in power grid 
r. Grid electricity prices 
s. PEM fuel cell operating costs 
t. Oil and natural gas prices 
u. Impact on U.S. of overseas deployment of stationary fuel cells 
v. Electric utility industry structure 
w. Competitors to PEM fuel cells 
x. Degree of penetration of PEM fuel cells into vehicle markets 
y. Extent of PEM fuel cell penetration into power applications 
z. Primary customers of PEM fuel cells 
aa. PEM fuel cell market size, $ 
4. Identification of key roadblocks  
5. Interesting results/conclusions High degree of success dependent on multiple 
conditions: 
Fully integrated fuel cell unit, with plug-n-play (inexpensive) installation 
Fuel cell image is important: “hi tech” 
Substantial technical advances needed 
Fuel infrastructure crucial, fuel competitively priced as commodity fuel 
Comprehensive, aligned codes and standards 
Substantial government support needed 
High electric grid prices 
Operating costs can be in medium range (10-20 cents/kWh) 
Need residential and light commercial market 
Point of market entry may be the isolated and high-value applications, 
followed by use as back-up and peak shaving power generation for 
commercial and office building customers 
6. Comments on overall credibility (judgment by reviewer) Conditions for full 
success seem excessive, unrealistic 
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Hydrogen Scenarios Literature Review:   
 
1. Full citation, including web site if applicable  Thomas, C.E., Hydrogen 
Transportation Transition Pathways,” Hydrogen Systems Modeling Workshop; 
Hydrogen Pathways Program, UCDavis, Sept 20,2004, Powerpoint Presentation 
2. Scenario description, if applicable 
a. Description of “vision,” if applicable: Basically a largely static analysis 
of technology/resource pathways, focusing on advantages of distributed 
H2 production from natural gas feeding first into H2 ICEs, eventually into 
fuel cells, with H2 production moving to renewables when they are ready. 
b. Dates and interval: 2000-2100; graph points at 1 year intervals 
c. Extent of focus on transition; possibly break out 2010-2030? 
Infrastructure investments begin before 2010, peak around 2023; no focus 
on specific time paths, though, that is, how things develop over time 
d. Key variables projected, e.g. petroleum consumption, carbon 
equivalent, FCV penetration, hydrogen price H2 infrastructure 
investments, oil import savings, pollution reductions (CO, GHGs, NOx, 
VOCs) 
e. Methodology: “eyeballing,” stock model, historic analogy, etc.  
Methodology for roll-in not described; extensive cost analysis of 
competing H2 supply options, vehicle options 
• Does analysis/modeling include consideration of hydrogen’s 
competitors, e.g. biomass to liquids? HEVs only 
f. Scope: LDVs only, total transport, other sectors included LDVs 
g. Geographic scope: regional, national, international National, California 
h. Hydrogen production: feedstocks (biomass, wind electricity, etc), 
technologies All 
i. Unique characteristics of the scenario development, e.g. risk 
analysis/scenario probability 
3. Identification of key scenario drivers: technology advances; government 
policy measures (subsidy/incentives; CAFE regulation; government fleets; 
demo projects; broken out by H2 specific and general); changes in consumer 
attitudes; high fuel prices Not a scenario analysis per se, no drivers….just a 
comparison of costs and benefits given hydrogen penetration, then an 
examination of scenarios that postulate 100% penetration of competing 
technologies within a 100 year timeframe. 
4. Identification of key roadblocks  
5. Interesting results/conclusions  
a. HGM (Hydrogen Generating Module) on-site natural gas system provides 
lowest H2 costs (~ $2.85/gge) for natural gas price of $6.23/mmBtu; 
everything else is much more expensive either because of high delivery 
costs or high equipment costs/low efficiency. 
b. Electrolyzer issue: using cheap off-peak electricity saves less money than 
added by higher capital recovery costs (since only use equipment part of 
the day, need  larger electrolyzer) – so count on average electricity costs 
for electrolyzers 
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c. Gauging marginal electricity mix (thus, GHG emissions) for electrolyzers 
can be tricky.  Example shows that increasing renewables can shift coal 
from baseload only (implying all marginal electricity will come from 
natural gas) to load-following, implying some marginal electricity will 
come from coal….so (in this example) although overall GHGs from 
electricity may be down in the “higher renewables” case, GHGs from 
electrolyzers may be higher. 
d. Compared to gasoline ICEV GHG emissions, electrolytic H2 using 
marginal US grid mix nearly doubles emissions; SMR natural gas to 
compressed H2 in fuel cell yields 45 to 50% reduction; SR ethanol from 
biomass to H2 fuel cell yields 60-85% reduction 
e. Renewables reduce more GHGs in grid displacement than gasoline 
displacement via H2 production 
f. Fuel costs/mile: compared to gasoline ICEV @ ~ 8 cents/mile, ICE HEV 
@ 6, H2 from NG to ICE HEV @ ~ 5, H2 from NG FCV @~ 3-4….but 
other options with H2 are more expensive…cheapest is H2 from ethanol 
to FCV @~ 9 (I assume this has an onboard reformer….presentation 
doesn’t say) 
g. Maximum market penetration rates will vary substantially by technology, 
with gasoline HEV fastest, H2 ICE HEV next, H2 FCV next, renewable 
H2 slowest (presumably because H2 supply comes on slowly) 
h. Scenarios: gasoline HEVs will reduce future GHG emissions, but cannot 
outrun growth in travel demand; hydrogen from NG in HEVs can provide 
virtually the same GHG emission reductions as H2 from NG in FCVs; can 
use them as an affordable bridge to renewable H2 in FCVs. 
6. Comments on overall credibility (judgment by reviewer) Author is a well-
established analyst; key issue is costs of small SMR NG units, as the author is the 
president of a company that manufactures them. 
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Hydrogen Scenarios Literature Review:   
 
1. Full citation, including web site if applicable  Thomas, C.E., James, B.D., and 
Lomax, F.D. Jr, “Market Penetration Scenarios for Fuel Cell Vehicles,” Int. J. 
Hydrogen Energy, Vol. 23, No. 10, pp. 949-966, 1998.  
2. Scenario description, if applicable 
a. Description of “vision,” if applicable: Scenarios postulate early 
government investment that lowers costs to create an incentive for vehicle 
manufacturers and energy companies to invest in FCVs and hydrogen 
infrastructure.  Both pure hydrogen FCVs and reformer-equipped FCVs 
are examined. 
b. Dates and interval: 2005-2030, 1-year intervals 
c. Extent of focus on transition; possibly break out 2010-2030? In this 
case, transition is projected to happen quickly, so infrastructure investment 
peaks around 2020 or so.  The focus here is on examining industry 
investment and profits to check whether the transition is viable.  The 
transition is dealt with by starting with factory-built small-scale hydrogen 
appliances (reformers and electrolyzers) that can be easily and quickly 
installed in multiple sites. 
d. Key variables projected, e.g. petroleum consumption, carbon 
equivalent, FCV penetration, hydrogen price # of fuel cell vehicles; 
FCV cost; FCV investment and profit; hydrogen production and price; 
infrastructure investment; hydrogen fuel retailer annual revenue and 
expenses; public costs and benefits. 
e. Methodology: “eyeballing,” stock model, historic analogy, etc.  The 
number of FCVs sold each year is determined by price elasticity curves for 
vehicles and hydrogen, with hydrogen and FCV cost varying with 
production based on “progress ratios” that track cost reductions as 
production doubles and doubles again (an interesting feature of the 
progress ratios for vehicles is that they are company-specific – it is 
assumed that most of the gains are obtained by individual companies 
according to the number of vehicles they each produce, not as an industry-
wide phenomenon).  There are two markets for vehicles – one ZEV 
market (based on now –superseded California regulations) and one 
conventional market.  Paper does not describe how the price elasticity 
curves are derived.  FCV component and hydrogen production costing is 
based on a detailed costing analysis in cooperation with Ford.  Analysis 
estimates number of FCVs within range of fueling stations, given assumed 
station spacing, which determines the type of station (four sizes assumed, 
with specific technologies for each) and hydrogen production technology 
used, thus costs (for California and other “opt-in” States). 
Paper mentions market penetration scenarios including a list of 
government actions, but it is not clear what these scenarios are or how 
they are used in the analysis, no indication of how most of the actions on 
the list are used in the scenarios.  (There is an apparent disconnect 
between the statement that “key input variables to the model include 
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vehicle market scenarios and government actions” and the apparent 
reliance on simple price elasticity curves for FCVs and hydrogen, which 
would seem to determine a “market scenario” without any connection to 
government action.  There is some evidence that what the paper means by 
“vehicle market penetration scenarios” is really just estimates of vehicle 
costs, which in turn will determine penetration using the elasticity curves.) 
• Does analysis/modeling include consideration of hydrogen’s 
competitors, e.g. biomass to liquids? No 
f. Scope: LDVs only, total transport, other sectors included LDVs only 
g. Geographic scope: regional, national, international California and 
other States with ZEV mandates 
h. Hydrogen production: feedstocks (biomass, wind electricity, etc), 
technologies Natural gas and electricity; electricity sources come into the 
analysis only in considering greenhouse gas emissions 
i. Unique characteristics of the scenario development, e.g. risk 
analysis/scenario probability None 
3. Identification of key scenario drivers: technology advances; government 
policy measures (subsidy/incentives; CAFE regulation; government fleets; 
demo projects; broken out by H2 specific and general); changes in consumer 
attitudes; high fuel prices As noted, scenario drivers are not clear, since paper 
does not describe how most listed government actions are taken into account in 
the analysis.  Obvious drivers are initial hydrogen prices and vehicle prices, with 
progress ratios that drive down prices as production increases.  Model clearly 
assumes that there are subgroups of potential vehicle purchasers who will pay a 
premium for a high technology, ultra clean vehicle. 
4. Identification of key roadblocks No 
5. Interesting results/conclusions Key conclusions are: 
a. “Relatively small investments now by government and industry can lower 
the price of both hydrogen and FCVs and pave the way for continued 
markets for FCVs free of any government subsidy.”  This investment will 
provide a small market for early adopters, gradually increasing market 
share and driving down prices. 
b. Hydrogen in a FCV can compete with gasoline even with H2 from 
small scale reformers or electrolyzers.  
c. Small scale hydrogen appliances can avoid the chicken and egg problem. 
d. Use of onboard fuel processors create multiple inefficiencies – weight 
addition, inability to reuse exhaust stream so loss of 10-20% of the H2 in 
the exhaust (though some can be used elsewhere), dilution of the input 
hydrogen stream yielding fuel cell performance loss (demanding a larger 
fuel cell for same output) and reduction in system efficiency.   Methanol 
FCVs will get 28.6 to 37.9% less fuel economy than a pure hydrogen 
FCV; gasoline FCVs are down 36.7 to 55.8%. 
e. Hydrogen FCVs will get 3 times the fuel economy of a conventional ICE 
vehicle on the EPA test (I suspect this is quite a bit too high). 
f. Both the higher range and lower range pure hydrogen FCVs and the higher 
range methanol and gasoline FCVs yield over 20% internal rate of return 
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on investment!  The lower range gasoline FCV doesn’t penetrate the 
market. 
g. Similarly, the hydrogen gas industry will make over 20% rate of return.  
Both conclusions depend on the government investing over $400 million 
in the initial 10 year period. 
h. Although small electrolyzers are crucial in supplying hydrogen to smaller 
stations, they will soon be superseded by steam methane reformers. 
i. In any case, electrolyzer use will dramatically increase greenhouse gas use 
given the U.S. marginal electricity mix.  And renewable electricity would 
reduce greenhouse gases more by displacing fossil fuel electricity rather 
than making hydrogen. 
6. Comments on overall credibility (judgment by reviewer) 
a. The authors note that “the model outputs should be taken as a very broad, 
qualitative indication of what is possible in the long run…greatest value 
will be in comparing alternative transportation options, and in assessing 
the possible impacts of various government and industry actions.”  This is 
a useful warning, although even the comparative value of the outputs must 
be assessed carefully, since the high uncertainty associated with estimated 
costs and performance could easily skew the comparisons.  However, 
there is strong value in applying a unified analysis to multiple options, 
with such parameters as discount rates and assumptions about 
technological progress being applied uniformly to all options. 
b. Assessment of costs, although extremely uncertain, appears to be rigorous.  
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Hydrogen Scenarios Literature Review:   
 
1. Full citation, including web site if applicable Owen, N. and Gordon, R., 
“Carbon to Hydrogen Roadmaps for Passenger Cars: A Study for the Department 
for Transport and the Department of Trade and Industry, Ricardo Consulting 
Engineers Ltd., RCEF.0124.31.9901, Client Confidential.  
2. Scenario description, if applicable 
a. Description of “vision,” if applicable: There are two vehicle scenarios 
• Low Carbon Route, with gradual electrification of vehicles 
leading to a full Prius-style diesel hybrid (basically heading 
towards fleet-wide penetration), ending with hydrogen fuel cell 
vehicles possibly with full hybrid plus fuel cell APU as an 
interim (bridge) vehicle (original list included a series hybrid, 
series hybrid with reversible fuel cell, and hydrogen ICE with 
reversible fuel cell, parallel hydrogen ICE hybrid, and parallel 
CNG hybrid with hydrogen APU – all unlikely to be practical) 
• Hydrogen Priority Route, moving from very mild hybrid (stop-
start and regen) ICE vehicles directly to a very mild hybrid 
hydrogen ICE, adding 42V crankshaft-mounted electric machine, 
then adding a small hydrogen fuel cell APU and finally moving 
to a hydrogen fuel cell vehicle considerably earlier than the low 
carbon route. 
The scenarios do not consider infrastructure development or hydrogen 
production, although, in fuel cycle analyses, it is assumed that hydrogen 
will be obtained from natural gas for the period evaluated.  
b. Dates and interval:  
• Low Carbon Route 
1. Stop start vehicle   2004 
2. Stop start + regen braking  2007 
3. Stop start + regen + downsizing 2010 
4. Full parallel hybrid   2012 
5. Series hybrid (rejected)  2015 
6. Series hybrid + reversible fuel cell 2020 
7. Hydrogen ICE + reversible fuel cell 2025 
8. or Parallel hydrogen hybrid ICE 2020-2025 
9. or Parallel diesel hybrid + H2 APU 2020-2025 
10. or Parallel CNG hybrid + H2 APU 
11. Fuel cell vehicle    2030 
• Hydrogen Priority Route 
1. Stop start vehicle   2004 
2. Stop start + regen braking  2007 
3. Hydrogen ICE with stop start + 
Regen  2008 
4. Hydrogen ICE Mild Hybrid  2010 
5. Hydrogen ICE Mild Hybrid + 
Small APU 2012 
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6. Hydrogen ICE Parallel hybrid with 
8 kW APU 2015 
7. Fuel cell vehicle   2020 
c. Extent of focus on transition; possibly break out 2010-2030? This is all 
about the vehicle transition – trying to answer the question, “What is the 
best route for transitioning from a current conventional diesel vehicle to a 
hydrogen fuel cell vehicle?” 
d. Key variables projected, e.g. petroleum consumption, carbon 
equivalent, FCV penetration, hydrogen price Individual vehicle price, 
well-to-wheels CO2 emissions, vehicle weight 
e. Methodology: “eyeballing,” stock model, historic analogy, etc.  
Ricardo basically asks the following question: “Given a baseline vehicle 
powered by a modern turbocharged direct injection diesel, what 
technology route would be best followed to reach the final goal of a fuel 
cell vehicle?”  Ricardo’s approach is to evaluate, for two different 
scenarios, the costs, well-to-wheels CO2 outcomes, manufacturer and 
consumer risks and issues, and other factors (including whether or not the 
intermediate technology steps would make sense for the long-term if fuel 
cell vehicles ultimately were not successful).  This is strictly an 
examination of technology introduction at the individual vehicle level.  
Careful evaluation of technology prices, technology impact on efficiency 
and well-to-wheel emissions; inclusion of costs and efficiency impact of 
emission controls to achieve existing and projected future emission 
standards.  Minor attention paid to issues such as refueling. 
• Does analysis/modeling include consideration of hydrogen’s 
competitors, e.g. biomass to liquids? No 
f. Scope: LDVs only, total transport, other sectors included LDVs only; 
primary analysis on a vehicle of the class of a Ford Focus, e.g. compact 
car, with simple assessment of applicability to other LDV classes 
g. Geographic scope: regional, national, international not applicable 
h. Hydrogen production: feedstocks (biomass, wind electricity, etc), 
technologies No evaluation of hydrogen production; natural gas reforming 
assumed as production technology for the purpose of well-to-wheels 
analysis 
i. Unique characteristics of the scenario development, e.g. risk 
analysis/scenario probability Very strong focus on economic/market 
pressures on the industry, and on customer preferences 
3. Identification of key scenario drivers: technology advances; government 
policy measures (subsidy/incentives; CAFE regulation; government fleets; 
demo projects; broken out by H2 specific and general); changes in consumer 
attitudes; high fuel prices Key drivers are said to be strong government 
incentives 
4. Identification of key roadblocks Both technical and market-oriented: 
a. Technical  
• Need to greatly improve efficiencies of all electric components 
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• Requirement to greatly reduce cost, improve efficiency, reduce 
precious metal content of fuel cells 
• Problems with hydrogen ICEs -- NOx emissions, difficulty of 
obtaining adequate power density  
• Solid oxide fuel cell for APU has startup issues, crash safety 
issues 
• Need to resolve onboard hydrogen storage issues 
• Performance of fuel cell support systems – compressors, thermal, 
control, and electrical systems – are virtually never described by 
developers 
• Vehicle platform issues for interim hydrogen solutions such as 
use of hydrogen APUs with diesel powertrain. 
• Weight reduction technologies will be crucial in dealing with 
weight gains from added components in moving to greater 
electrification 
• The need for rapid infrastructure growth can conflict with safety 
issues, training issues – note that much of the service and fueling 
infrastructure is outside of the direct control of the vehicle 
manufacturers 
b. Market 
• Very high cost of introducing new products 
• Need to prepare the dealer/servicing network 
• Need to manufacture any new technology in significant volume 
in order to be cost-effective 
• Risk of a new technology attracting adverse publicity due to poor 
reliability or unexpected safety or environmental issues 
• Customer acceptance issues about acceleration feel of hybrids 
(susceptible to state of charge of the battery), engine shut-down 
during idle (and perhaps during deceleration and low speed 
driving), limited range 
• Resale values can be an important issue, given rapid technology 
changes, consumer acceptance risks for early models.  
5. Interesting results/conclusions  
a. Starting from TDI diesel as a baseline, a move to a hydrogen ICE reduces 
efficiency because the hydrogen ICE is spark-ignited.  European diesel 
perspective may be different from U.S. gasoline perspective. 
b. With natural gas-based hydrogen, mid-range efficiencies would allow a 
fuel cell to only match the well-to-wheels carbon efficiency of a diesel 
parallel hybrid.  Even with the highest efficiency gains, the overall CO2 
gain is not more than 10-20% until zero-carbon hydrogen is available.  
c. The Hydrogen Priority route is difficult because a number of the interim 
technologies are replaced soon after introduction, e.g. hydrogen ICE 
engine, fuel cell APU.  However, moving directly to the fuel cell vehicle 
would yield very high cost initial vehicles with severe infrastructure 
issues, severe consumer issues. 
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d. Important to consider alternatives to hydrogen, e.g. renewably synthesised 
liquid fuels. 
e. For the Low Carbon route, it is unlikely that any of the technology steps 
between step 4, the parallel hybrid, and the fuel cell vehicle will succeed 
because of their expense and lower efficiency without accompanying 
consumer benefits.  However, the manufacturers may want to develop 
these steps in small quantities.  The fuel cell APU is a possible exception, 
since it add to vehicle functionality….though with considerable cost and 
packaging challenges. 
f. The incremental low carbon route is to be preferred over the 
hydrogen priority route, because the former is compatible with 
industry practices and the latter is not.  Radical technology change is 
viewed as harmful to the industry’s financial viability and likely to be 
viewed by car-buyers as leading to reduced reliability, difficult 
maintenance, high depreciation, and high trade-in risk.  The evolutionary 
steps to the fuel cell also represent CO2 benefits that would be lost if we 
had to wait for the full-fledged fuel cell vehicle without intermediate low-
carbon technologies.  And early fuel cell vehicles will be prohibitively 
expensive, especially if no intermediate technologies are allowed to 
develop and to reduce costs and increase performance over time.  
Progressive electrification offers more manageable risk coupled with 
significant CO2 benefits.  
g. Vehicles will have to meet progressively more stringent emission, safety, 
and consumer demands – trends in conventional vehicles show huge 
improvements in all of these factors, and such trends will continue…so 
advanced vehicles must anticipate having to meet substantially changed 
standards from those of today. 
h. Strong government promotion of advanced technologies is crucial to their 
development – R&D funding, vehicle purchase schemes, support of 
infrastructure development, and so forth 
i. Some technological bridges to fuel cell vehicles may represent a step 
backwards in cost and performance (for example, switching from a diesel 
engine to a hydrogen IC engine) yet play a valuable role in advancing 
infrastructure or other goals – which will require particularly strong 
government interference in the marketplace. 
6. Comments on overall credibility (judgment by reviewer) This analysis should 
be judged as extremely credible based on both the excellent reputation of Ricardo 
and the careful, dispassionate analysis.  A key question must be, however, 
whether or not Ricardo is correct in assigning such a high priority to the need for 
an incremental approach to avoid market and technical risk.  Also, Ricardo’s 
analysis focuses almost exclusively on the vehicle; issues about hydrogen 
production and delivery infrastructure are obviously crucial to comprehensive 
scenario evaluation. 
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Hydrogen Scenarios Literature Review: R. Silberglitt and A. Hove, RAND 
Corporation, Scenario Analysis 
 
This is a detailed examination of a large group of future energy scenarios from a wide 
variety of groups ranging from the Energy Information Administration and International 
Energy Agency to Royal Dutch Shell to a group of environmental organizations.  The 
purpose is not directly related to hydrogen energy futures, and many of the scenarios do 
not project a major role for hydrogen – though many do.  Also, the review does not focus 
on transitions and does not attempt to examine this issue in depth….but our previous 
examination of a range of scenarios found that virtually all of them did not address 
transition issues in any depth, and this appears to be the case with most of the scenarios 
examined in this review. 
 
The review examines the following scenarios: 
• Energy Information Administration: AEO 2000 with variants, two Kyoto Protocol 
analyses; 
• Other econometric scenarios: IEA, GRI, AGA, IPAA, DRI, WEPA 
• World Energy Council/International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis 
• Royal Dutch Shell (Sustained Growth and Dematerialization) 
• IPCC 
• ACEEE, ASE, NRDC, UCS, Tellus (America’s Energy Choices) 
• Stockholm Environment Institute Global Scenario Group 
• Inter-laboratory Working Group (Scenarios of U.S. Carbon Reductions, Scenarios 
for a Clean Energy Future) 
• PCAST 
• Romm, Rosenfeld, and Herrman (The Internet and Global Warming) 
• Jesse Ausubel (Where is Energy Going?) 
• Amory Lovins and Brett Williams (Strategy for the Hydrogen Transition) 
• California Air Resources Board (Status and Prospects of Fuel Cells as 
Automotive Engines)  
• A.D. Little (Distributed Generation: Understanding the Economics) 
• Miscellaneous studies of specific energy resources, e.g. solar, geothermal 
 
Key Conclusions/Observations 
1. All of the scenarios fit into one of four clusters 
 Moderate growth-high environmental impact, basically 
extrapolation of current trends, though slight recarbonization with 
nuclear decreasing 
 Moderate growth-low environmental impact through improved 
technology 
 High growth-moderate environmental impact, basically business-
as-usual growth but better technology 
 Low growth-benign environmental impact, environmentally 
conscious world, technology improvements, and change in lifestyle 
2. One more scenario should be added: Low Energy Growth – Moderate 
Environmental Impact, either through economic downturn or supply 
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constraints or both, no new technology.  This wasn’t considered in the 
group of scenarios studied because all of them ignored surprises. 
3. And this is a crucial conclusion: surprises, in the form of resource 
constraints, oil disruptions, or environmental surprise (large sign of global 
warming?) are not considered in any of the scenario analyses. 
4. U.S. history is one of growth, crisis, adjustment, and more growth.  At 
times energy growth has stopped (1974-1984). 
5. The low growth-benign environmental impact scenarios demand that the 
U.S. do something it has never done before.  Examples:  
 Decarbonization over last 40 years ~ 0.2%/yr; optimistic scenarios 
call for 1.6-2.6%/yr  
 Energy productivity (GDP/energy use) over past 40 years has 
increased by 1.8%/yr; pulling it down to 75-80 quads or so would 
require 3-5%/yr increase. 
 To analyze such a scenario properly demands explicit examination 
of rate of turnover of energy conversion and utilization equipment, 
time needed to implement lifestyle changes (work patterns, public 
transportation, land use). 
6. Many scenarios suggest natural gas as a transition fuel, but there are real 
issues about natural gas supply that must be explored.  Many scenarios 
assume U.S. production can be greatly increased (EIA Reference Case 
projects 9 additional quads by 2025 – a 40% increase) – seems debatable.  
7. Also, many scenarios (esp. EIA) assume ready access to increased oil 
imports from Persian Gulf. 
  
89 
Hydrogen Scenarios Literature Review  Bernow, S., “Challenges in Researching the 
Transition to a Hydrogen Economy,” Nov 14, 2002 – key points: 
1. Technology characterization: need scale dependence, technology learning 
function 
2. Characterize existing hydrogen production facilities, potential for excess supply 
3. Characterize existing feedstock potential, including electricity – including 
location 
4. Characterize effect of electricity, natural gas use for hydrogen feedstocks on 
overall supply/price 
5. Estimate potential demand for stationary hydrogen use, interaction with hydrogen 
availability for transportation 
6. Develop scenarios for urban areas – specific cities or idealizations? 
o Resource constraints/endowments 
o Infrastructure needs and costs 
7. Need cost curves/scale dependency of costs 
8. Assessment of electric system impacts – analysis of true marginal electric sources, 
needed to identify carbon impacts 
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Hydrogen Scenarios Literature Review:   
 
1. Full citation, including web site if applicable  Bailie, A., et al, Tellus Institute, 
Hydrogen Transitions in a Greenhouse Gas Constrained World, Volume I: 
Main Summary Report, Draft, August 2005. 
2. Scenario description, if applicable 
a. Description of “vision,” if applicable: two contrasting policy contexts – 
BAU and GHG-constrained” – with each having a hydrogen  and non-
hydrogen scenario; also, a BAU+year 2025 shock that demands rapid 
hydrogen deployment.  Transition is driven initially by fleet use and 
limited introduction of dual-fueled ICEVs.  
b. Dates and interval: 2005-2050 
c. Extent of focus on transition; possibly break out 2010-2030? No 
specific breakout, but scenarios move from low demand and decentralized 
production to intensifying demand and centralized production, so 
transition is described; one figure gives delivered hydrogen costs in first 
10 years of scenario 
d. Key variables projected, e.g. petroleum consumption, carbon 
equivalent, FCV penetration, hydrogen price Vehicle stock, crude oil 
demand, carbon emissions, delivered cost of hydrogen and individual cost 
factors, e.g. capital costs for facilities, etc. (not clear whether this is 
calculated outside or inside of model) 
e. Methodology: “eyeballing,” stock model, historic analogy, etc.  Stock 
model is used, but details of other modeling and calculation unclear from 
report.  Feedstock types apparently are assumed in model, based on 
external analysis considering resource availability.  Key assumption is 
FCV sales, which apparently drives hydrogen demand 
• Does analysis/modeling include consideration of hydrogen’s 
competitors, e.g. biomass to liquids? No 
f. Scope: LDVs only, total transport, other sectors included Road 
transport plus cogeneration/combined heat and power. 
g. Geographic scope: regional, national, international National and four 
cities 
h. Hydrogen production: feedstocks (biomass, wind electricity, etc), 
technologies multiple 
i. Unique characteristics of the scenario development, e.g. risk 
analysis/scenario probability inclusion of a “shock” scenario 
3. Identification of key scenario drivers: technology advances; government 
policy measures (subsidy/incentives; CAFE regulation; government fleets; 
demo projects; broken out by H2 specific and general); changes in consumer 
attitudes; high fuel prices Analytically, scenario is driven by assumption of 
penetration of FCVs and dual-fuel ICEVs; but scenario logic is that extensive 
government incentives coupled with societal attitudes drives the scenarios. 
4. Identification of key roadblocks Discussion primarily; analysis doesn’t directly 
focus on roadblocks.  R&D hurdles; existing infrastructure for gasoline; “chicken 
and egg;” competing solutions. 
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5. Interesting results/conclusions  
a. Hydrogen remains considerably more costly than gasoline 
b. FCV lifecycle costs don’t match CVs for lifetime of study 
c. All of the long-term climate-friendly options are centralized options 
d. Grid electricity will not allow climate-friendly hydrogen 
e. In the near term, hydrogen development will have negative benefits 
f. A credible hydrogen scenario will take as much as 50 years to unfold. 
6. Comments on overall credibility (judgment by reviewer) We need access to 
the Volume II, the methodology report, to appropriately evaluate credibility. 
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Hydrogen Scenarios Literature Review: Andrews, C.J., and Weiner, S.A., “Visions of 
a Hydrogen Future,” IEEE Power & Energy Magazine, March/April 2004. 
 
This paper is a discussion of issues facing a hydrogen transition, e.g. the types of 
incentives that will be needed for a successful transition and other public policy issues 
such as the criteria for judging alternative pathways.  Points in the paper applicable to 
transition modeling are: 
1. “Policymakers must have insight into the external and internal issues and 
challenges faced by the organizations whose actions are intended to be 
motivated.” 
2. Both companies and localities may prefer to take the lead or else follow (and 
assume fewer risks), and incentives must be designed for each. 
3. “State and local policies will strongly influence the development of a hydrogen 
economy, and State and local governments vary greatly in their preferences, 
capabilities, and circumstances.  The seeds of the hydrogen transition will 
encounter more fertile soil in some jurisdictions than in others.” 
4. Reviewer’s comment: The key here is that modelers will have to take account of 
local and State conditions and policies, and these will vary considerably from 
place to place….implying a real challenge to modeling the transition.  Clearly, 
significant parametric analysis will be required, at a minimum.  
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Hydrogen Scenarios Literature Review:   
 
1. Full citation, including web site if applicable  Tseng, P., Lee, J., and Friley, P., 
“A Hydrogen Economy: Opportunities and Challenges,” Energy,  not published at 
time of review. 
2. Scenario description, if applicable 
a. Description of “vision,” if applicable: Transition to hydrogen where low 
feedstock costs and low fuel cell system and hydrogen production costs 
allow hydrogen to compete with gasoline.  For example, 2015 fuel cell 
vehicle incremental cost is 15%, or $3,000 for a $20,000 vehicle.  
Production cost of hydrogen is $0.50-$1.00/GGE at the gate, with 
moderate transportation costs. 
b. Dates and interval: 2000-2050, in 5 year increments 
c. Extent of focus on transition; possibly break out 2010-2030? Transition 
period is not explicitly singled out, but model should be able to handle 
transition issues.  However, paper states that it “does not address the 
chicken-and-egg problem.” 
d. Key variables projected, e.g. petroleum consumption, carbon 
equivalent, FCV penetration, hydrogen price Full range of variables, 
from gasoline price and consumption to hydrogen price to FCV 
penetration to carbon emissions. 
e. Methodology: “eyeballing,” stock model, historic analogy, etc.  
MARKAL model – dynamic linear programming model (finds a least-cost 
solution to meet user-specified energy service demands, e.g. vmt).  
“Special attention was paid to the expansion path of manufacturing 
capacity that produces hydrogen, fuel-cell vehicles, and infrastructure.” 
• Does analysis/modeling include consideration of hydrogen’s 
competitors, e.g. biomass to liquids? Yes, slate of production 
technologies includes a biorefinery capable of producing liquid 
fuels; vehicle technologies include hybrids and diesel hybrids. 
f. Scope: LDVs only, total transport, other sectors included MARKAL is 
economy-wide, so other sectors are represented; paper does not make it 
clear whether stationary hydrogen fuel cell use for electricity/heat/cooling 
is a factor. 
g. Geographic scope: regional, national, international National 
h. Hydrogen production: feedstocks (biomass, wind electricity, etc), 
technologies Coal, natural gas, biomass, electricity 
i. Unique characteristics of the scenario development, e.g. risk 
analysis/scenario probability Not apparent 
3. Identification of key scenario drivers: technology advances; government 
policy measures (subsidy/incentives; CAFE regulation; government fleets; 
demo projects; broken out by H2 specific and general); changes in consumer 
attitudes; high fuel prices Paper seems to imply that the only driver is 
government R&D that helps drive costs down to competitive levels; no other 
policy measures are mentioned in the scenario description. 
4. Identification of key roadblocks Potential roadblocks discussed include: 
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a. Potential for technology lock-in if infrastructure is established to 
accommodate a particular technology, e.g. natural gas. 
b. Declining gasoline price caused by hydrogen penetration could slow 
market penetration of fuel cell vehicles.  Significant alteration of refinery 
economics can cause problems with petroleum products.  Oil producers 
could try to maintain market share by dropping prices to marginal cost of 
producing oil.  
5. Interesting results/conclusions  
a. The market penetration of fuel cell vehicles – 50% of passenger travel by 
2050 – coupled with improved efficiency in vehicles using liquid fuels -- 
moderately reduces primary energy use and substantially reduces oil use.  
In 2050, primary energy use is reduced by 7.5 EJ from the reference 173.6 
EJ, or 4%.  Oil use is reduced by 17 EJ in 2050, from a reference of about 
70 EJ, or about 25%. 
b. The substantial reduction in gasoline use yields a decline in gasoline price 
of over 50% by 2030, as gasoline changes from a premium fuel to a joint 
product or byproduct.  Prices for diesel fuel and petrochemical feedstocks 
rise as reduced refinery throughput reduces refining flexibility. 
c. Oil prices do not drop substantially from the reference case, because it is 
assumed that oil producers do not expand supply as rapidly as in the 
reference case.  However, an alternative assumption could be that 
producers would try to maintain market share by keeping prices down 
closer to the marginal cost of production.  This would yield sharply lower 
oil prices and a different equilibrium (lower hydrogen share) than if oil 
prices had remained high. 
d. With the higher price for petrochemical products, biorefineries capable of 
producing both such products and hydrogen might become attractive, 
depending on successful outcome of ongoing R&D for such plants.  
Similar opportunities may exist for coal and other renewable technologies. 
e. Also, petroleum refiners will have strong incentives to develop new 
refining technologies that allow production of substantially less gasoline 
while maintaining high production of other products. 
f. Policymakers might want to insure that gasoline prices will not drop as 
much as projected, to maintain national security objectives and to boost 
penetration of hydrogen vehicles. 
6. Comments on overall credibility (judgment by reviewer)  
There are insufficient details in the paper to allow judgment about credibility.  In 
particular, it is unclear how the transition to hydrogen occurs, and how the market 
barriers are overcome.  Note that hydrogen system costs are assumed to be at 
levels that make hydrogen cost-effective. 
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Hydrogen Scenarios Literature Review:   
 
1. Full citation, including web site if applicable  California Environmental 
Protection Agency, California Hydrogen Blueprint Plan, Volume 1 and 11, Draft 
Final Report, March 2005; also, Rollout Strategy Topic Team Report; California 
2010 Hydrogen Highway Network, January 5, 2005. Website: 
www.hydrogenhighway.ca.gov   
2. Scenario description, if applicable   
a. Description of “vision,” if applicable: Three-phase plan to introduce 
hydrogen to California highways, with the goal of making California “a 
world leader in hydrogen development and deployment,” to improve 
California’s energy security and environment and reap major benefits in 
economic growth: 
• Phase 1: 50-100 stations (from 39 current and planned) by 2010, 
serving  primarily fleet vehicles (up to 2,000 LDVs, including 
some hydrogen ICE vehicles; 10 heavy-duty vehicles), with 5 
“energy stations” – concentrated in urban areas, with a few on 
highways linking areas.  These stations must have “anchors,” that 
is, a baseload demand source – probably government fleets.  
Also, government sites should be looked to for stations, 
especially building on existing national gas refueling sites 
(though public access points must be carved out). 
• Phase 2: 250 stations, 10,000 LDVs, 100 heavy-duty vehicles, 60 
stationary or off-road H2 applications, more energy stations, 
hydrogen home fueling stations; strategic stations linking urban 
areas 
• Phase 3: 20,000 LDVs, 300 heavy-duty vehicles, 400 stationary 
or off-road H2 applications, doubling of capacity utilization, 
expanded role for energy stations 
• In all phases, a mix of hydrogen-production technologies, 
adoption of a statewide uniform permitting process and 
regulatory approvals of hydrogen stations, 50/50 government 
cost share for stations, with $10,000/vehicle incentives for fuel 
cell vehicles during Phase 1 
b. Dates and interval: 2010 completion of Phase 1; Phase 2 and 3 
timeframes are not specified 
c. Extent of focus on transition; possibly break out 2010-2030? Transition 
only 
d. Key variables projected, e.g. petroleum consumption, carbon 
equivalent, FCV penetration, hydrogen price Fuel cycle energy and 
emissions on a “per vehicle” basis; total station costs, operating costs, and 
revenues  
e. Methodology: “eyeballing,” stock model, historic analogy, etc.  
Engineering analysis without attempting to use formal modeling or even 
stock model – just focused on the transition without worrying about 
retiring and replacing vehicles. 
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• Does analysis/modeling include consideration of hydrogen’s 
competitors, e.g. biomass to liquids? No 
f. Scope: LDVs only, total transport, other sectors included Highway 
vehicles plus some stationary H2 use in multi-use refueling stations 
g. Geographic scope: regional, national, international California urban 
areas with highway networks interconnecting 
h. Hydrogen production: feedstocks (biomass, wind electricity, etc), 
technologies Multiple production technologies and feedstocks 
i. Unique characteristics of the scenario development, e.g. risk 
analysis/scenario probability No 
3. Identification of key scenario drivers: technology advances; government 
policy measures (subsidy/incentives; CAFE regulation; government fleets; 
demo projects; broken out by H2 specific and general); changes in consumer 
attitudes; high fuel prices Basically full State government involvement in 
planning and financing vehicles and infrastructure: government fleets; 
government 50/50 cost share of stations, and $10,000/vehicle subsidy for fuel cell 
vehicles; development of codes and standards, and uniform station siting 
protocols; State education and publicity initiatives.  Consideration of an array of 
measures, ranging from fuel subsidies to reduced vehicle registration fees to HOV 
lane access for H2 vehicles. 
4. Identification of key roadblocks “Chicken and egg” problem (for which this 
scenario plan was designed to overcome); lack of codes and standards 
5. Interesting results/conclusions  
6. Comments on overall credibility (judgment by reviewer)  
This is the most ambitious and thorough planning measure reviewed, with exceptional 
attention to station siting and other issues.  However, it all depends on some very shaky 
foundations – huge declines in technology costs; public and company willingness to 
purchase vehicles with limited refueling options, potential resale problems, and highly 
uncertain maintenance costs; company willingness to invest in stations that might end up 
stranded, with a history of failure in methanol, for example; etc.   
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Hydrogen Scenarios Literature Review: Papers/Reports About Potential 
Roadblocks to a Hydrogen Economy 
 
CERA, “The Hydrogen Economy: How Far and How Fast?, Cambridge Energy  
Research Associates, 2003, www.cera.com
 
1. Reviews the generally well-known issues with hydrogen, e.g. low energy density, 
energy requirements for production, distribution, and compression, on-board 
storage issues 
2. Electrolysis issues: current 75% process efficiency; issue of competition from 
direct use of electricity in EVs (or plug-in hybrids?) 
3. Compression energy ~ 50% of H2 energy content for 10,000 psi 
4. Hydrogen is the most expensive of numerous options to remove CO2 from the 
economy 
 
Bossel, U. and Baldur, E., “Energy and the Hydrogen Economy,” January 8, 2003, 
http://www.idatech.com/technology/fuel_processors.html.  
 
1. Basically this is an energy analysis of hydrogen, concluding that it is not practical 
as a fuel except for niche markets, and suggesting instead that we should turn to 
synthetic hydrocarbons based on renewable carbon sources. 
2. Energy density: at 800 bar hydrogen, same density as liquid hydrogen; methanol 
is 1.8 times denser, gasoline is 3.4 times denser not counting storage tank 
differences 
3. Compression energy ~ 7.2% of H2’s HHV for 200 bar, ~13% for 800 bar, not 
including electrical losses (appears to contradict CERA’s 50% estimate above, but 
perhaps that estimate includes electrical losses) 
4. Liquefaction energy will not be much below 30% of HHV of the H2 for very 
large plants; and energy rises markedly for smaller plants 
5. Storage in chemical hydrides is also very energy intensive: 59% of HHV for 
CaCO3, 76% for NaCl, 62% for LiCl 
6. 22 tube-trailer hydrogen trucks or 4 liquid hydrogen trucks would be required to 
deliver the same amount of energy as one gasoline truck 
7. Existing gas pipelines cannot be used for hydrogen because of diffusion losses, 
brittleness of materials and seals, incompatibility of pump lubrication with 
hydrogen, etc. 
8. Long-distance pipeline shipments: 1.4% H2 consumed/150 km 
9. Local electrolyzers: generation and compression to 200 bar; total energy  = 150% 
of H2 HHV 
 
Science, Toward A Hydrogen Economy, Vol 305, August 13, 2004. 
 
1. News: The Hydrogen Backlash 
a. Current steam reformers are 85% efficient 
b. 10,000 psi tanks ~ 8 times gasoline storage volume for equivalent energy 
content 
  
98 
c. Hydrogen tank truck going 500 km uses energy equivalent of 40% of its 
cargo 
2. Turner, J.A., “Sustainable Hydrogen Production” 
a. Conversion of total U.S. LDV fleet ~ 100 billion gallons of water/year, 
vs. 4800 billion gallons/yr for domestic personal use, 300 billion 
gallons/yr for gasoline production 
 
Wilson, J.R., “The Truth About Hydrogen, Version 4.0,” TMG/The Management 
Group (www.tmgtech.com), September 25, 2003. 
 
This is a detailed response to Amory Lovins’ “Twenty Hydrogen Myths.”  Crucial points, 
especially with regard to modeling a transition, are as follows: 
1. PEM cell efficiency is ~ 35-50% (30-40% at high load, 40-50% at low load), not 
the ~50-70% often claimed, when all accessory and parasitic losses are accounted 
for. 
2. Reliability and durability of fuel cells, especially membranes, still requires major 
work.  Unless this issue is laid to rest, it must be well accounted for in vehicle 
choice modeling. 
3. Although load reduction is a key way to reduce the hydrogen storage problem, 
Lovins’ suggestion of ultralightweight composite bodies ignores the many failed 
efforts at developing mass-manufacturable composite bodies. 
4. Small-scale reformers and electrolyzers represent a major safety problem, 
especially given the likely problem of maintenance. 
5. Hydrogen safety – although hydrogen does disperse rapidly, hydrogen flames are 
intensely hot, hydrogen is extremely flammable, and hydrogen flames and 
explosions can quickly involve other energy sources. 
6. As with other critiques, great care must be used in doing a well-to-wheels analysis 
of hydrogen, particular with regard to compression and liquefaction energy costs, 
things like AC-to-DC power requirements, large transportation energy 
requirements, etc. 
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Hydrogen Scenarios Literature Review:   
 
1. Full citation, including web site if applicable:  Towards a European Hydrogen 
Energy Roadmap, HyNet, May 12, 2004.  
2. Scenario description, if applicable 
a. Description of “vision,” if applicable: Hydrogen buildup in portable fuel 
cell applications (important in getting the public comfortable with 
hydrogen, not important with regard to hydrogen supply), stationary 
applications beginning in 2006-2008 based on reformer-supplied 
hydrogen, with hydrogen delivery infrastructure developing after 2020), 
and transport beginning with fleets, moving to passenger cars around 
2010-2015, with a mix of fuel cell and ICE hydrogen vehicles.  Mid-range 
scenario of 50,000 cars by 2010, 530,000 by 2015, 5 million by 2020 
(range: 2-9 million)  
b. Dates and interval: as above 
c. Extent of focus on transition; possibly break out 2010-2030? Primary 
focus is on transition, primary issues that will arise 
d. Key variables projected, e.g. petroleum consumption, carbon 
equivalent, FCV penetration, hydrogen price Focus of paper is on 
identifying transition issues rather than projecting impacts, so little 
attention to tracking variables – scenarios defined by number of vehicles 
and resulting hydrogen demand (e.g., 2-9 million hydrogen-fueled cars 
create demand for 0.2-1.8 million (metric) tons of hydrogen annually. 
e. Methodology: “eyeballing,” stock model, historic analogy, etc Expert 
judgement; no indication that a stock model was used 
• Does analysis/modeling include consideration of hydrogen’s 
competitors, e.g. biomass to liquids? No 
f. Scope: LDVs only, total transport, other sectors included As noted, 
multi-sector 
g. Geographic scope: regional, national, international European Union 
h. Hydrogen production: feedstocks (biomass, wind electricity, etc), 
technologies Wide range of production alternatives 
i. Unique characteristics of the scenario development, e.g. risk 
analysis/scenario probability None 
3. Identification of key scenario drivers: technology advances; government 
policy measures (subsidy/incentives; CAFE regulation; government fleets; 
demo projects; broken out by H2 specific and general); changes in consumer 
attitudes; high fuel prices Key driver is government policy, including 
government procurement of fleet vehicles, with strong technology advances 
required, need for stakeholder partnerships; exploiting synergies among different 
end use sectors, e.g. hydrogen vehicles and windpower; special features of vehicle 
and stationary hydrogen use, e.g., for stationary, higher efficiency, reduction in 
noise, reduced maintenance, high availability, improved grid reliability and 
synergy with other energy end-use sectors. 
4. Identification of key roadblocks Identification of roadblocks is a key output of 
this paper: risk of stranded investments; concerns about business case for 
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refueling stations (chicken and egg issue); need for advances in onboard hydrogen 
storage; costs of hydrogen transport and storage; lack of small reformers in the 1-
10kW class (for stationary use). 
5. Interesting results/conclusions  
a. Transition phase fueling station infrastructure for 5,000-10,000 stations, 
supporting 2.0-4.4 million vehicles (5,000) to 5-9 million vehicles 
(10,000), 4-8% of European stations: 4-7 billion euros for 5,000, 7-15 
billion euros for 10,000. 
b. Very large risks in refueling investment, difficult balancing act between 
maximizing station usage with fewer stations and automakers’ need for a 
fast vehicle ramp-up, which requires maximum consumer convenience. 
c. Planners must assume that unforeseen barriers exist, so must maintain 
vigilance and be ready to react. 
6. Comments on overall credibility (judgment by reviewer)  
Thoughtful evaluation and recognition of uncertainties and important barriers.  
Did not clearly recognize vehicle cost as a significant barrier, which it is. 
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